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INTHODUCTIOU 
This thesis is concer~ed with a number of problems that arise 
in conjunction with the necessary, allowed, or disallowed core-
ferentiality of a complement sentence ~ubject with some NP in a 
higher sentence. Such constraints have been variously treated in 
the literature as conditions on a transfo:nnation--generally known 
under the name of EQUI-NP-DELETION--or. as conditions on the well-
formedness of underlying (deep) structures. Rega.rd.less of this 
important distinction, such constraints have been.stated as governed 
by verbs--henceforth COSUB verbs--which require that some IiP in the 
same simplex sentence as them oe coreferential vith the subject of 
an immediately lower complement sentence, henceforth the deletee. 
The higher noun phra.se--the "controller NP"--has been identified, in 
all analyses to date of' which I run aware, as the sub,iect, direct 
object, or indirect obJect of s.ome COSUB verb, thereby ma.king it 
necessary that COSUB verbs be idiosyncratically marked for a 
subject--subject, direct object--subject, or indirect ohJect--
subJect constraint. 
The basic claim of this thesis is that these three separate 
constraints are unnecessa::ry, and that they reduce rather naturally 
to the subject-subject case, given independently motivated analyses 
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of COSUB verbs, within the theoretical framework which has come 
to be known as "generative semantics." 
The first chapter of thi~ thesis reviews a number of previous 
proposals on controller NP identity and evaluates the strength of 
their claims. The second chapter briefly presents the generative 
semantics asswnptions that are pertinent to the ensuing discussion, 
and considers the validity of some arguments that have been offered 
in the literature. The third chapter attempts to justify the elimina-
tion of idiosyncratic verb-marking--henceforth the Marked Verb 
Proposal--in favor of a subject-subject constraint applicable to a 
rather natural verb-class--henceforth the Subject-Subject Pronosal. 
The semantic primes introduced in chapter 3!are defined in the Appendix 
to that chapter. In chapter four, the interplay of underlying-
structure constraints and EQUI is discussed in the light of recent 
. . ' 
proposals to allow the application of EQUI at more than one point in 
a derivation and across an arbitrary number of sentence-nodes. 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE MAI1f PROBLEMS DISCUSSED IN PREVIOUS 
TRAUSFORMATIDNAL TREATMENTS 
I 
Rosenbaum's Identit~ Erasure Transformation 
In his book on complementation in Englisn, Rosenbawn (1967) 
posited a rule of EQUI-NP-DELETIOU {in·his terminology. the 
nideiltity erasure tra.nsforma.tion") wh.ose role va.s to delete the 
subject of certain complement sentences, when coreferentia.lity with 
a.n NP in a higher sentence and a set of other conditions were 
satisfied. He vas not concerned with how to state _fo?1,1d.lly the 
fact that coreferentiality is obligatorJ for certain verbs. This 
problem vas attacked by Lakoff (1965) and Perlmutter {1968) and I 
shall return to it belov. 
Rosenbawnrs Identity Erasure Transformation~ vhich is claimed 
to be cycli~aJ. and obligatory, is reproduced in full below: 
w (MP) X +D NP y (NP) z 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(i} 5 is erased by 2 
(ii) 5 is erased by 7 
The following conditions (henceforth the erasure 
princi2le) govern the application of the identity 
erasure transformation. An NP 1 is erased by an identical NPi if and only if tliere is a. Sa such that 
(i) NPj is dominated by Sa 
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(ii) 	 NPi neither dominates nor is dominated by Sex 
(iii) for all 2-iPk neither dominatinp; nor domina.ted by 
Sa. the distance betveen l-1Pj nnn :,rpk is r:reater than 
the distance between HP.i ana HP., where the c.istence 
between t•,;o nodes is defined in~te~s of the nur.-.ber 
of branches in the path connectinP, them. 
'!'he following points are worth noting in connection ~ith this 
transformation: 
{A) The complement sentence whose subject is deleted is 
introduced by either the FOR-TO or the POSS-rnG complementizer (this 
is the import of the feature +D • .,,hich is nlL~bered u in the SD of 
the rule). 
{B) 	 The rule is oblip;a.tory. 
(C) The controlle:- is in the sentence immediately above the 
deletee. 
(D) There is a speci:ic and necessary configurational relation 
between the controller and the deletee, 
(E) 	 Whenever EQUI is applicable, the ilP that qualifies as 
controller 	is unique. 
{F) The rule i~ cyclical. 
The rest of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of {A)-(F) 
above. Each point is expanded as a sub-section bearin~ the corresponding 
symbol. 
(A) 	 Complementizers allowi.n~ EQUI_ 
To the best of my knovledge, the claim that EQUI is onl..v 
appiica.ble in the presence of either FOil.-TO or POSS-ING has not 
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beeri challenged and I shall e.ssurne tha:t its validity is not in 
question. !Io more will be so.id on this issue in the remainder of 
the thesis. 
(B) Obligatoriness of EQUI 
The claim that EQUI is always oblige.ton· is slightly too stronp;. 
?here are clear casest like (1) and (2), in which EQUI is optione.1. 
Such optionality exists, in the speech of the informants I have 
consulted, vith POSS-Il,JG only. 
(l) a. M:, shaving myself annoyed me. 
b. Shaving rnyself annoyed me. 
(his }(2) 	 a. John talked to Jill a.bout •1 her bee.tinµ: up Torn. 
tjheir 
b. John talked to Jill a.bout oea.tinp; up Tom.  
~{oreove:r, Postal (1968) points out tha-t;. EQUI is optione.: for some  
r.ominalizations, e.g.:  
(3) 	 a. Hisi realization that you knew Grete disturbed 
TonYi• 
b. The realization that you knev Greta disturbed 
f..~J~ 
Tony. 
The observation concerning nominalizations is pertinent only within 
b\he framework of a ~rammar that derives nominalizations transforma-
tionally. 
Another shortcomine in Rosenbaurn 1s treatment is his failure to 
rlotice that EQUI is sometimes inapplic~ble, even though the above 
structural description is met. Postal {1968) points out a p;reat 
Pumbe~ of restrictions on the operation of EQUI. For examnle, EQUI 
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cannot apply backwards when the controller NP is indefinite: 
(4) *Finding out Greta we.s a vampire astonished somebody. 
Postal correctly points out that (4) cannot be an instance of 
violation of u..,derlying structure well-formedness conditions involving 
coreferentiality relations, for {5}, which presumably is derived 
from the same source as (4), is well-formed: 
(5} 	 Somebody was astonished at findin~ out Greta was 
a venrpire. 
Ho..,e•rer, it does not ine'litabl~' follow that ( !.: ) illustrates a 
restriction on EQUI. It could just es ¥ell be a restriction on 
surface structure well-forrnedness, or on the well-formedness of the 
output of some late transformation. 
(C) The 11 liroited domain'' hvuothesi s 
Althou~h Rosenbaum's rule does not in fact claim that the 
applicability of EQUI is limited to two ec~elons of embeddin~, this 
assll!nption seems to underlie all the exa.rnpl~s given in his book. 
Iiotice that it may seem that this assi.unption, although not explicitly 
stated, is implicit in the rule, since the erasure principle stipulates 
t.hat if there is e.n N? in the im.'?lediately hip;her sentence, that one 
only is a possible controller. Such reasoning is, however, invalidated 
by cases in which the im:nediately higher sentence has only one ~TP, 
which in turn contains the complement sentence itself, as in examples 
{6) a.nd (7). 
(6) John thinks that shaving himself would be a mistake. 
(7) Jopn thinks that it is improbable that shavin~ 
himself would be a mistake. 
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In (6), there 	is one intermediate leYel of embedding between the 
controller and the deletee, in (7) there are two such. The it in (7) 
would not 	prevent .John from acting as controller, since .!.1 is a N, not 
a NP. (In fa.ct, in later f'ormulations .of EQUI, ~ would not even be 
present in the string at the point when EQUI acplies, as it would be 
introduced by 	EXTRAPOS!TIO!f (Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 1968), vhich •,.rould, 
moreover, 	be a post-cyclic rule (Ross, 196To).) As (6) and (7) are 
permitted 	by Rosenbaum 1s rule, it follows that the limited domain 
hypothesis is 	not explicit in his f'ormulation, although it seems tc 
be implicit in his practice. The hypothesis is incorrect, as sho-r.m 
by (6), (7) and (8). The latter also provides further supnort for the 
cle.im that EQUI ma.y be o~tional. 
(8) 	 a. Georgei explained how it ......; possible for himi 
to defend himself ~ith a pencil. 
b. 	 Georgei explained how it was possible to defend 
himself1 with a pencil. 
For additional counter-examples to the limited domain h:rpothesis, 
see chapter four, section tvo. 
~' (D) The nosition of the controller in the structural descrintion 
The confiy,urational relations holdinP, between the erasing and 
erased HFs are defined by Rosenbaum's erasure :principle. Laying 
aside for the moment certain problems that ·<lll be discus?ed in 
connection with point (6), Rosenbaum's principle vould seem to work 
·,,.· 
;,,·'· 
,'~' fairly 	well. Consider now the following sentence: 
(9) 	 That John has proven himself incomoetent makes it 
imperative for him to leave. 
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whose underlying structure is t s~hematica.lly:, (9 t ) : 
{9') 
PDP 
\-. 
~
V NP--S ~ \3~ 
D 	 N .NP PDF
1Di6 ? 
J 	 ""---~ 
it 	 John pr.ove himself makes it it John leave ! 
incompetent j.niperat 
-------
On the penultimate cycle, FOR-TO is assigned to s14 , a!lc! <:in the last 
cycle, •rF.:AT is .a.ssiene9, to s2 . Afte.r this, the leftmost occurrence 
of John. e~n d:~J.ete the ~!ghtmost one:, as the conditionj:; for the 
application of' EQUI, a.s s.tipUlated by Rosenbau.'tli., a.:re sa.tis:t:'ied.. Birt 
this Will 	1·esult in (10), which is not; a. para.phrase o.f (9) : 
( 10} Tha.t John ha.s proven hiI:1sel.f inc_o!I)petept makes it 
.imperati'Te to leave. 
Therefore (J,O) cannot have a.risen by a.pplica..tiqn of EQU! to somia. ste.ge 
in th.e derivation of' {9 ). 1{otice abo that EQU! could not have 'been 
blocked by the presence or it, which is .en N, not an NP. 
!t a;ppeti.rs that the position of the controller is not defined 
rn.trr.ewl;y enough,., a.""l.a. I think that:· Le.ri:gf:!.c\ker (196.6-,) succe.eded . .iil: 
e%i14;.n~t:ll;tg :tlle ~¢~~1;r~l;>le 9:p:p).ieat~<,n of .:EQUJ: t.~ ·UP}... ,&~ia~eke.r 
i 
:1:if*Lci~ai.es. tbs.~ ·tb;e. eo~t.:r('.)i.ler ':~~ ~µ~·rt. ~~~~ ~9-~ 4,~l.et~e::,. ~u:t t·h.:e 
l,$;,t/:t¥:r "imJ.st riot '·eolntland :tn, f:orme.r'.... This autbmat±cJ:i.lJ:y ':li.ules:: .eut 
' -
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commands the other, Langacker also notes that the command-notion 
a.lone is not strong enough to limit the scope of EQUI. Indeed, 
it woul.d allow the derivation of (11) b from (11) a, although 
the tvo are not paraphrases. 
(ll) a. John knows that Jill wants him to leave. 
b. John knows that Jill wants to leave. 
Some principle must be found, therefore, to prevent John from 
deleting the identical.. subject of the complement sentence, which 
it commands without being coll'l!!landed by it. Langacker offers tvo 
possible candidates, the principle of control and the principle of 
limited donain. The notion of control is defined as follovs: 
given three nodes A, B, C; B controls C from A if (a) A co:mrn.a.nds 
B, (b) both A and B command C, (cl B does no·~ command A, and (d) 
C doea not command either A or B, The principle of coL~rol says 
that the controller must control the deletee. This can explain why 
the first occurrence of John cannot delete e coreferentia.l subject 
of the complement sentence: it is prevented from doing that by ill!, 
vhich controls the complement subject, and screens the latter from 
the influence of the leftmost John. The principle of limited domain 
says that a rule vhose domain is limited in this particular vay can 
only apply to a string involving two echelons of embedding. It is, 
in fact, no more than {C) of page4, As the leftmost John involves 
a third echelon of embedding, it cannot act as controller, and the 
principle of limited domain accomplishes the same thing as the 
principle of control in this case. 
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It looks like the principle of control a..11d not that of limited 
domain should be used in the rorreule.tion of EQUI, because of 
sentences like (12): 
(12) 	 John said that Jill knew that it would be hard to 
( *himsei.r}criticize Lherself • 
Both principles can explain why John does not qua.liry as controller, 
but the principle of 	limited domain fails to explain why Jill does, 
as it is t ..o :levels ot~ embedding above the deletee, 
It should be pointed out t.he.t vha.t Le.ngacker accomplishes by 
the principle of control, Rosenbaum accomplishes by condition (iii) 
of his minimal distance principle. Indeed_, in (12), ~ does not 
qualify es controller f'or there is an UPk• Jill, that is closer to 
the complement subject than John. Also, despite Rosenbaum's failure 
to use a notion equivalent to 11 com.'::la.nd't, that is, despite his failure 
to specify that the Snode which most immediately dominates the 
controller must also dominate the erased' rJP, condition (iii) of·hia 
minimal distance principle ~ill in general ensure that the controller 
commands the erased NP. In (9 1 ), according to his formulation, the 
leftmost John qualified as controller because it vas not an NP, 
However, if this instance of John had been in a relative clause, it 
could not have acted as controller. Consider (13), vith the under-
lying structure (13' ) : 
, 	 ~herself f(13) The girl vho Jonn knew ~anted to vash 
*himself"., 
----------
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(13 1 } 
NP 
s 
PDP 
I  
UP S VP  
~
I 
D 
I 
N NPv --------~
l'I s 
I ~
John knew the eirl wanted it X ,.,.a.sh X 
Here, if! is corcferential ~ith Jobn, EQUI cannot apply, as the 
5.irl is closer to ! than John is. :EQUI can onlY e.pply if X is 
corefer~ntial ·with lli girl. 1 
Bxcursus on Rosenbaum's Minimal Distance Princinle 
In section (E), I shall shov that the assumption that the 
controller is always unique is untenable. LPt us, however, pretend, 
in this excursus, that it can be defended, and take a look at some 
conclusions that Rosenbaum arrives at by incorporating it into 
his description of the English complement construction. 
One of Rosenbau.~'s most important claims is that complementation 
is of two types: NP- end VP-compl9lllentation. He maintains that 
The girl 
(14) is a.n instance of NP-complementation, while {l5) is an instance 
of VP-cMplementation. 
(14) I require of you to be here on time. 
(15) I prevailed upon John to go. 
He argues that the minimal diste.nce principle 11applies with such 
tema.rkable precision to so many cases" ths.t apparent counter-
examples may be assumed to be false ones~ Then he claims that the 
------
------- -----
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principle breaks down if an ?1?-complementation analysis is given 
for (15}, but holds if VP-co,mplementation is chosen inetead. 
Observe, however, the structures (14 1 } and (15'}, which Rosenbaum 
cla.i:ns underlie (14) o.nd (15) respectively, if NP-complementation 
is assumed: 
(14 1 ) 
S1~"HF PDP 
I 
VP ..;-----~c-:;--------.:.PP----~ D ll S P ~NP ~ 2"' 
NP VP 
I 
! require yo~ be here on ti~e of you 
(15') 
s-----1-------NP PDP 
YP ADVPv-----~ P~INPI 
p NP D N · S2
I 
~
f ~
I prevail upon John John go 
The boxed MP ·w'hich dominates the complement sentence is vi.thin the 
main VP in (14 1 ) but outside it in (1.5'). Rosenbaum gives no 
ex-planation for this difrerence, but it and nothing else causes the 
minime.l distance principle to break down. lt is ensy to see that 
G-13  
if the complement sentence is brought within the domain of the 
ma.in VP the principle holds in both (lli') and (15'); this is true 
even if the NP thet dominates s2 is in turn dominated by a PP 
n.ode. The solution proposed by Rosenbaum is {1511 ). 
(1511 ) 
NP PDP ------
s -----I 
VP 
pp l.!lP I 
~ I 
p NP s 
/'--...
NP VP 
I I 
I prevail ,upon John John go 
Notice that it not only eliminates the boxed NP above s2 , but it 
also puts s2 within the domain of VP. Had he merely removed the 
NP, the principle would not have failed to work like in (15 ' ). 
The authors of Integration£!. Transformational Theories on 
Enp;lish Syntax (henceforth : ITTES) consider two alternatives to 
Rosenbaum's for mulation, neither of vhich constitutes a genuine 
alternative. First, they consider the possibility of all.owing 
EQUI to apply after the rules of subjectivalization and obJecti-
valization (the framevork they assume is Fillmore's case grammar, 
io vhich subjects and objects are not represent ed in the deep 
structure). They claim that if the minimal distance principle 
applies at that stage, it will vork correctly a.nd "in a. ver'Y' natural 
way 11 in cases like (14) e.nd (15), .tithout requiring the addition 
of VP-complementation to the grammar. However, their solution 
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proves n9thing about the naturalness of case grammar, since what 
they did was place the complement sentence _within the main VP, 
thereby e]iminating Rosenbaum's inconsistency. As I stressed above, 
Rosenbaum's framework works no less naturally in this particular 
case if his inconsistency is removed. The authors ,of ITTES reject 
this solution however, since the ordering of transformations they 
propose requires that EQUI precede subjectivalization and objecti-
valization. .. They propose to identify the controller NP by its 
case label as follows: when the sentence immediately higher than 
the complement contains both an AGENT and a _DATIVE, the latter 
qualifies as controller. This second alternative is in fact equivalent 
to Rosenbaum's principle, for, unless.the topmost sentence is 
passivized, the DATIVE always ends up as object a~d is therefore 
"closer" to the complement subject than the AGENT, which ends up as 
subject. Passivization of the topmost sentence does not affect-
"r , . . 
the controller· status of the DATIVE, since (15) is a paraphrase of (16): 
(16) John was prevailed upon by me to go. 
In Rosenbaum's framework, passivization is irrelevant to the 
issue, for EQUI a.pplfes before passivization. But in ITTES' framework, 
it becomes relevant, fo'r passives are not derived from actives, and 
·structutes roughly like· (14' )' ?,nd_ (15' ) are not avaii~ble at any 
pofnt i~_ the_ derivation oi ·a passive. ':tr the minimal distance 
principle is.allowed to work a_fter passi~ization, it will make false 
predictions. Therefore, not only' consideratio'ns of rule orde~ing, 
but also the· unavaila.bilfty of; an active-like· structure in the 
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derivation of pe.ssive sentences forces ~ 1 authors to choose the
1 
second alternative rather than the first. A corolla.r'J of this 
conclusion is that if the first alternative is chosen, the case 
grammar framework will turn out to be less, rather than more, 
natural than the one assw:ned by Rosenbaum, as the minimal distance 
principle will only work for active sentences, To swn up: if 
passives a.re derived from actives, a statement in terms of case 
nodes is equivalent to the minima.1 distance principle, If passives 
are not derived from actives, only a statement in terms of cases is 
possible. It should be clear, however, that Rosenbaum 1 s and ITTES 1 
solutions are equivalent in predictive power, given the Aspects 
and Case Granima.r frameworks respectively. 
(E) The Controller-Uni_g__ueness Problem 
We have seen that the notion "commands" in conjunction with the 
principle of control disqualifies a large number of NPs from e.ctini:: 
as controllers. Hovever, this does not yet ensure uniqueness of 
controller, for there may be several NPs which control--in La.ngacker's 
sense--the deletee. Consider the folloving hypothetical structure: 
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The underscored UP is prevented from erasing the circled NP by the 
principle of control. However, the principle of control allovs 
both boxed !lPs to act as controllers. Rosenbaum obYiously assumed 
that only one of these possible candidates should be allowed to act 
as controller in each and every case, and hoped that the minimal 
dista..~ce principle would correctly identify the controller. Postal 
(1966) h&s shown quite convincingly that the uniqueness assumption 
is incorrect in general, end that constraints independent of EQUI 
(whic~'I assun:.e to be equivalent to Perlmutter 1 s (1968} constraints 
on the Yell-formed.ness of deep-structures) operate in the subset of 
cases vhere uniqueness is required. 
Rosenbaum's minimal distance principle must be rejected for 
at least three reasons: First, it is not quite clea.~ why there 
should be such a principle. Indeed, as RosenbeU!:! defines it, the 
:minirna.l distance principle is not semantic, for it does not operate 
on underlying structures. Neither is it e. perceptual strategy--
in the sense of Bever (1970)--for two reasons: (a) the input to a. 
perceptual strategy must be a surface string, not an intermediate 
stage in a derivation, and (b} a perceptual strategy can conceivably 
make use of linear distance, but hardly of distance measured in 
te:rms of tree branches. If the motivation for haYing a minimal 
distance principle is neither semantic nor perceptual, it is ha.rd 
to :,iee wha.t it could be. 
Secondly, as pointed out by Postal, the mininal diste.nce 
principle is !El required in a great nu.~ber of cases, and Langacke~'s 
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principle of control would be there sufficient (Postal apparently 
believes that something like the principle of limited domain is 
strong enough, as he refers to the sentence "immediately higher" 
than the complement), As an example, consider (18): 
(18) Harry talked to Bill about kissing Bertha. 
Postal notes that the deleted subject of kissing can be ambiguously 
understood as either Harry, or Bill, or oath. In addition, it 
seems to me that the deleted subject can also be understood as a 
generic, and I have found this interpretation to be possible in 
all the cases of ambiguous deletion I have been able to think of, 
A third argument against the minimal distance principle or the 
DATIVE-as-controller proposal (see page 14) is that either fails 
in at least tw-o types of cases, Consider tt~ following contrasts: 
(19) 	 a. I asked John to eat.  
b, I asked John when to eat.  
(20) 	 a. I asked John to go. 
b. I promised John to go, 
The tvo above mentioned proposals work in the sentences mlll'ked .!:.• 
but not in those marked:!?_. ITTES briefly takes up (20 b.), and 
attempts to dismiss it as a marginal case, a hybrid of the well-
formed sentences I ~rolllised to go and I promised John that I should 
~- Even if their solution constitutes a satisfactory explanation 
(which I have doubts about), the minimal pair formed by (19) a and 
b must still go unexplained. 
Postal proposes that ambiguous deletion be e.llo~ed within the 
limits of the principle of limited domain (he does not actually 
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use this phrase), and that uniqueness of controller be ensured, 
where required, by a nUtnber of modal constraints, Specifically, 
he proposes that sentences containing ir.finitivals of a certain 
kind2 be derived from structures in which the complement sentence 
contains a modal. These modals ~ould constitute the cause of 
controller uniqueness. He cites three separate modal constraints 
\toich :1e labels the OUght-, \,li.ll-Would-, and Would of intention-
modal constraints. He argues as follows: in the following pairs, 
the b sen~ences should be viewed as transforma.tionally derived 
from the structures underlying the a sentences: 
(21) 	 a. Harry told Max1 that he· [should } enlist in1 ought to 
the army. 
b. Harry told Max to enlist in the army, 
~(22) a. George asked Bill. ....~.,, hei would help Mary. 
l. 
b. George e.sked Bill to help t-1e.r.f. 
(23) e.. He.rry. promised Bill that he. would visit Gret.a.. 
l. 	 l. 
b. Harry promised B"l-11... to visit Greta.. 
He gives two reasons for believing that the a and b sentences are 
derived from a cormnon source--for any giYen pair: (e.) they are 
paraphrases, and (b) neither the verbe.l element following the modal, 
nor the infinitival can be statives. As an illustre.tion of (b), 
eor!sider pairs like: 
( 24} e.. *I told Harry that he should intend to go. 
b. *I told Harr.r to intend to go, 
(25) a. *I told Harry that he 01.:ght to be popular in France. 
b. *I told Harry to be popular in France. 
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To these two ar~ents advanced by Postal, I should like to 
add a third, namely: (c) ·ooth the a and the b sentence types are 
rather bad with "emotive" adve:-bials.3 By •.:ay of example, consider : 
reluctantly 
oddly 
(26) 	 a. in told Harry that he should go stupidly 
regret:ru.u~, 
intentionally 
etc. 
rreluctantly ~
J ~ddl:r I 
b. ~I told Harry to go :::~!~~lly J 
1~. int=~~:onally 
Two more arguments can be adduced here:~ (d) the sentence thev 
were misunder_:tood is ambiguous, es it c~n have 11a stative or 
durative .reading, as well as a res.ding on •,1hich a. single act or 
incident of :nisunderstanding is mee.nt. '' lfovever, in a a.nd b , only the latter 
reading is possible , e.g. 
(27) a . I told them that they ought to be misunderstood. 
b. I told them to be misunderstood . 
(e) in both e. and b, if misunderstood has an a~entive ~-phrase, 
the latter must be a "plural or collective noun phrase; it cannot 
be a singular ore. conjunction of singulars" (but see chapter 3, p. 
59. 	
J(28) a. I told them that they should be misunderstood y their friends rby the public at large*by Bill . *by Frank , ?ete and t•Uke ..._ 
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J(28) b, I told them to be misunderstood (by their friends 
) by the public at large 
l *by Bill *by Frank, Pete e.nd Mike 
It is important to understand the.t arguments {b) - (e) above 
do not offer final ?roof that sentences a and bin examples (21)-
(28) are deri •red from common sources, a.nd that instances of constraints 
that :fail to be shared would be particularly damaging to the common-
source h:rpo}hesis. If such counterexw:tples can be found, it ~ill 
mean that the sources of sentences a and b share certain properties, 
but are not identical. 
Observe now that certain problems arise in connection with 
arg1.l.ment {a}. First, a substantial number of native speakers ~hat 
: have consult.ed feel that (22) a. and bare cot paraphrases, a being 
more euphemistic than b, Secondly, the medals in (21) a are 
ambiguous, as theJ' can express ei the:r moral obligation or desirability, 
or a coID!:land. This ambiguity is ·made possible by the fa.ct that 
the verb tell itself is ambiguous between an informative or declarative 
reading and one of command. Therefore, (21) a can be construed 
either as an order given to Max, or a.s a statement of Harry's 
iDforming Max that he has a duty to enlist in the army. But (21) b 
is unwnbiguous, as it has only the command reading, and it is necessary 
to posit t~o underlying representations for (21) a and require that 
only the command reading be considered a possible transformational 
cognate of (21) b. 
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In additio~ to these semantic considerations, there are syntactic 
facts that suggest that there should be two separate sources for 
the readings of (21) a. Postal himself furnishes one argument, 
no~ing that, for certain speakers, M can be understood as a 
coreferent of either Harq or Max, and that this ambiguity is 
:possible onJ.y when the modal has a. 11mora11' interpretation rather 
tha.n an 11 im:pera.ti...-e 11 one. 
Secondly, a command can only be aimed at a moment in time 
later than that at which it is spoken, while a moral duty can 
hold at the moment of its utterance, and we expect this distinction 
to have syntactic consequenees. Deviant sentences based on tense 
restrictions a.re hard to construct, for the present continuous--
the only "real present"--ca.n also refer to a. future time. Thus, 
(29) is grammatical , 
(29) Be 	 ~orking! 
for it may be continued as 
(30) Be vorking when I return from work! 
It is therefore necessary to appeal to time edver~s in order to 
bring out the morel/imperative distinction, and this is done in (31): 
(31) 	 a. I am telling you that you ought to be working 
at this very mo~ent. 
b. 	*I am telling :,ou to be working at thi_s very 
moment. 
c. *Be working 	at this very moment! 
ThirdJ.y, non-emotive adverbials are acceptable vith moral modals, 
but not with imperative ones: 
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J~~~::~;~bly1{32) a. I told John that he should rr,o,1_.~ndoubtedl:,J 
Grooably } 
b. *I 	told John to~ conceivably ( go.
l.....undoubtedly _; 
It might be thought that (32) bis bad because a.n adverb intervenes 
betveen to a.nd the verb. But this suspicion vanishes i.rhen "\.l'e 
consider the behavior of please: 
(33) 	 a. *John should please go. 
b, I told John to please go 
c. John, please go! 
Fourthly, the complement sentence can pa.ssivize vith both 
kinds of rnodals, but the underlying structures would not be the 
same. This can be seen rather clearly in ('.14): 
{34) a. I told Jill that she ought to be ~yanked for 
what she did to her husband. 
b, I told Jill to be spanked for what she did to 
her husband. 
Perlmutter, in his dissertation, ar_gues rather convincingly that 
passive imperatives ought to be embedded in a sentence .those subject 
is core:f'erential vi th the surt'a.ce passive subject, vhose ,,erb is 
or let, and which gets deleted by a later transformation. His 
argwnents are both semantic and syntactic, Semantically, notice 
that {35) bis a paraphrase of (34) b 1 but (35) a is not a ~ara-
phrase of {34) a: 
rr:r.et]{ 35) 	 a. l told Jill that she OUBht to (.let f,someone)• to 
spank her for i.rhat she did to her husband. 
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(35) b. 1. {someone) to} spanktold Jill to[~:! 
her ~or ~hat she did to her- husband. 
Syntactically, it is not possible to use all Perlmutter 1s 
a.rgw:nents, for some constraints on structures ~ith ~ or get are 
also shared by moral modals. However, it is possible to use some. 
Firstly, sentences ~ith be rumored cannot be embedded to sentences 
.rith lEt or e;et. Therefore, (36) is ungra.m.ma.tical because (37} 
is ungrammatical. 
(36) *Be rumored to enjoy surftng.  
(37)*jGet} yourself to be rumored to enjoy surfing.  
~et 
The fact that (38) a, but not (38) b, is grammatical, suggests that 
the latter, but not the former, has be rumo~ed embedded to let or 
{38) a. I told Greta that she ought to be rumored to be 
a frenk (considering that she had destroyed 
so many people I s reputations) • 
b, *I told Greta to be 2"1.lJJlored to be a freak. 
Secondly, sentences like (39) are ambiguous between a reading 
which refers to a single incident and a durative or stative reading. 
{39) Greta vill be misunderstood. 
However, if {39) is embedd.ed to a sentence with ~ or ~' only 
the former reading is possible, as seen in (40): 
(40) Greta will get herself (to be} misunderstood,. 
If moral moda.ls do not contain a 1_tl or e;et, we would e)..--pect the 
complement sentence in (41) a to remain ambiguous, and this prediction 
is indeed con.firmed: 
{41) a. I told Greta that she cup.ht to be misunderstood 
fat the eveninF. party J 
lfor the rest of her life 
b, ~ told Greta to be misunderstood 
.Ja,t the evening part;r } 
~for tie rest of her 1i fe 
'I-le have ex~.:ninecl. a substant ia.l body of evidence which leads to 
the conclu.sion that mor~ a.nd imperative medals a.re cyntor,tice.lly 
distinct . The problem to be considered next is whether embedded 
infinitivals with imperative force si1ould be derived i'rom structures 
c;: 
containing inperetiYe mods.ls.;; 
Observe tt.e.t Postal postulates three s epa.re.te modal constraints 
for ha:1dling '.1hat is felt to be a single phrnomenon, the embedded 
ir.ipera.tive. This is :10t in itself objectionable, excent that 
und.e.rlying medals are chosen on the 'basis of those that happen to 
appear on the sur fe.ce. I se.y 11happen, 11 because verbs like be,g, 
beseech, imolore, d.isa11o·...r surface medals, nnd Postal. is forced to 
require en obligatory rule of infinitivaUza.tion for these ve:rb$. 
Notice that the choice of one modal constraint over another become$ 
rath~r ad-hoc in this case. 
Hext, verbs that take di:fferent surface medals do not exhibit 
a.~ underlying se~antic distinction parallel to that obtaininp, 
betveen the i:10da.ls . Consider the pair: 
( 4i} a.. I told John 1;o leave • 
b. I asked John to leave, 
--
Acc.ord1ng to Posta.l, tell requires 'the Ought constrai.nt, while ask 
requires the Will-Would constraint. But the distinction bet~een 
(42} a and bis, at least partly, p;r:'eiuppositione.)., in that the 
former but not the latter presupposes ·that t~e subject enjoys a 
position of authority over the object. Viola:t;ion of this presup-
position leads to such oddities as (43): 
(43) a. ?The accused told· the court to be lenient . 
b, The accused asked the court to be lenient. 
!n addition to this, there probably is· a difference between the 
• 
meanings of tell and ask, as the forme'r describes f;i command and 
the latter a request , and there appears to be a difference of 
degree between tQe tvo notions. Notic·e that the pre~up:position 
mentioned above need not be specified for tell, it is probably a 
, . 
feature of s.11 command-verbs . Be this as it me.y, neither the 
difference in degree, nor the presuppopition are explained by the 
pr esence of ought rather than~ (out see also chapter 3, p. 78). 
Another difficulty with sentences. ~ontaining mode.ls is that 
they do not al.ways constitute perfect :para.phras:es of corresponding 
sentences containing infi nitivals, at least for some speakers (e.Y,., 
(22)). 
Furthermore, the 'W'i.11-i.rould modal . constraint seems to be 
' .requi~ed ro~ ask and no other verb . '~is makes the constraint look 
suspicious, but does not necessarily indicate that it is vrong, for 
it is possible that ask have some idio~yncratic properties. 
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Postal attempts to unify the phenomena that he presents as 
:nodal ccnstz-aints by pointing out that all the sentences where the 
constraints appear to work contain iligher verbs of lingui::;tic 
communication describinR a non-declarative performance. Declara~ive 
veros a.re_ exempted from such constraints, and the controller J;p may 
·oe anbiguous ·,rithin the limits allowed b:1 the principle of limited 
domain. 'ler·os like tell ere ambiguous bet•.,.een a decla.rative l'l.nd a. 
non-declarative reading, and their beinr, subject to the constraints 
is a function of their reading in particular sentences, The sa.r.e 
a.'T!biguity is exhibited by the so-called 11 verbs of manner of speech 11 , 
like scream, s::1out, ~. whisner, etc. 
It should be made clear that Pasta.l's modal constraints on 
non-declarative characterization of sorrie \rerh.s of linguistic 
communication only attempt to delineate the class of verbs that 
require controller uniqueness, but a.re _powerless to predict ;.;hich 
particular rTP will be chosen as controller in specific cases. They 
furnish no princi:r,le by ·.;hich we can predict 1:.h,at the controller 
is the sub,ject of a verb like nromise but the obJect of a ·.r~rb 1 i.ke 
tell. 
Postal proposes to handle controller-unique cases by rosi.tinr: 
idiosyncratic deep structure constraints for verbs referrin~ to 
non-declarative performances. Earlier, I called this the Marked Vero 
Proposal. Thi$ proposal would require that the sub,jects of certain 
verbs and the ob,jects <:rf others be coreferentia.l with the subject 
of the complement sentence in deep structure. 6 Therefore, " ..• the 
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fact that the linguistic verb ask of request requires EQUI to 
delete a.n NP vhich is a coreferent of its indirect object is a 
function of the deeper fact that this verb requires its complement 
subject to be a coreferent of its indirect object •.• ". 
Notice that the kinds of deep structure constraints to which 
Postal refers are not limited to non-dsclerative linguistic verbs. 
In a trivial sense, they apply to verbs like ~rite, cable, nhone. 
In a. more interesting sense, they apply to verbs like nersuade and 
force vhich cannot be said to embed an imperative, and can therefore 
have nothing to do with modal constraints. There might be n 
semantic featUl'e that non-declarative verbs of communication {oral 
or otherwise) and verbs like oersuade and force share, but this ..,_~- -~-
feature is cot easy to define, 
As a. first appro::dma.tion, we may try "futUTe-orientation11 , in 
the sense that the time of the complement is later than that of the 
COSUB verb. For example, in I order y:_ou to leave, the leaving can 
only take place after the order has been given. However, there 
are verbs which exhibit this future-oriented feature, but do not 
require coreferentiality~ e.g.,~' predict, forecast. We notice 
however that the latter three verbs can embed either statives or 
non-statives, while COSUB verbs embed non-statives only. Therefore, 
we may try to characterize the COSUB verbs with two features, i.e., 
+FUTURE ORIENTED and -STATIVE EMBEDDING, or in more informal language, 
"oriented towards future actions alone 11 • The one embarrassing case 
that I wn awe.re of is try, vhich does exhibit the coreferentiality 
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constraint but embeds some statives in addition to non-statives. 
In the Ap~~ndix, p. 86, I suggest a possible way of getting around 
this fact. 
Recently (April 1970), Karttunen proposed an interesting 
classification of English predicate complement constructions, which 
comprised four basic classes: Factives, Implicatives, If-Verbs, 
and Only-if-Verbs. These four classes can be roughly defined as 
follows: 
(a) Both the assertion and denial of a Factive comrnit 
the speaker to the belief that the complement is true. 
(b) The assertion of an Implicative commits the speaker 
to the helief that the complement is true, while the 
denial of the implicative cor~its the speaker to the 
belief that the complement is false. 
(c) The assertion of an If-Verb commits the speaker to 
the belief that the complement is true. 
· (d) The denial of an Only-if-Verb commits the speaker to 
the belief that the complement is false. 
There is no reason to believe that the COSUB verbs coincide with 
anr Karttunenian subclass.or any group thereof. Rather, if the 
COSUBs constitute a natural semantic class,·this class seems to cut 
across Karttunen 9s taxonomy. 
The semantic characterization of COSUB verbs I offered above 
is extremely tentative; however, in testing its empirical validity, 
it will be necessary to distinguish between genuine counterexamples 
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and apparent ones resulting from homophony. For instance, the 
two instances of tell in (44) and (45) are really instances of 
different but homophonous verbs, the former only bein~ e COSUB verb. 
{44) I told him to get out. 
{45) I told him that the weather is fine. 
In general, COSUB veros do not take the TliA'r complementizer, but 
I do not think that this should be generalized, in view of verbs 
like confess, which a.re COSUBs even with TlIAT. This can be seen in 
the following paradigm:, 
(46) I confess that I killed John. 
{47} *I confess the.t Viary killed John. 
In connection with the m.inim~l pair exhibited by (19), Postal 
adopts a suggestion or McCawley 1 s to the effect that (19) bis 
underlain by (48): 
(48) 	 r1 asked JohnJ to tell mei (the answer to the 
~uestion) when Ii should eat. 
in which case (19) b reduces to the already known constraints on 
tell, The only difficulty is that telling someone the answer to a 
question looks like a declarative performance, and declarative tell 
carries no con.st:ra.ints. This difficulty is probably more apparent 
than real, and I attempt to provide a.n explanation in chapter three. 
(F) The cyclicity of EQUI 
Postal notes that Lak.off (1968) gave some rather convincing 
evidence in support of the proposition that EQUI is cyclical, 
Lakoff's argument runs briefly as follovs: the rules of SUBJECT-
RAISING and PASSIVE are cyclical. If EQUI can be shown to have to 
occur before some occurrences of SUBJECT-RAISING and PASSIVE and 
after some others, this vill prove that EQU! is cyclical. Now 
consider (49). with an underlying structure roughly like (49'}: 
(49) 	 Harry was believed by everJone to have wanted to 
seduce Lucille. 
(!~9 t) (Everyone believed marry wa.nted [Ha.r:ry seduce Lucille: 
1 2 
It is clear that Ha.rrf was raised and then moved to the left by 
l 
passivization. It must also delete Harry; if EQUI applies after 
2 
raising and passivization, its structural description must be 
considerably complicated to be allowed to reach across eve;yone. 
But if EQUI applies firstt no modifications are necessarf, Therefore, 
EQUI must precede certain applications of RAISING and :PASSIVE. 
Consider now (50) and its underlying structure (50'): 
(50) Joe wanted to be seen by Ma.ry kissing Betty. 
(50 1 ) (Joe wanted CNary see [Joe kiss BettyJJJ 
1 2 
In 	this case, i'f EQUI applies first, Joe must e:rase Joe a.cross Mary, 
1 2 
and the structural description of the rule becomes more complex. 
But if RAISHfG a.nd PASSIVE apply first, Joe is brought in a 
2 
position where its deletion becomes straightforward. 'l'hereforei EQUI 
must follow certain applications of RAISING and PASSIVE. Since 
EQUI must follow certain instances of RAISH1G and PASSIVE--W"hich 
are cyclical rules--it follows that EQUI ca.n be neither a precyciical 
or a postcyclical rule, and can only be cyclical. But the ordering 
indicated above is not only dictated by criteria. o:f simplicity, it 
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is the only actual possibility. The reason for this is that 
·EQUI may have to apply more than once in a structure, and it 
is theoretically possible to construct structures in which an 
arbitrary nu.'11.ber of applications ofEQUI is required. As there 
is no natural limit to the number of times EQUI may apply, if 
EQUI is not cyclical. its structural description becomes unstatable. 
By way of example, consider (51), where the seqi..ence EQUI-RIHSIHG-
PASSIVE must apply on t•.l'o cycles. 
{51) Joe WBJ> thought by eYeryone to want to be seen 
by Mary tr:,ing to kiss Lucille. 
( 51') [Everyone thought [Joe wanted [Ma..7 see [Joe try 
1 2 
[Joe kiss LucilleJJJJJ 
3 
Joe deletes Joe, then it is raised and Fassivizetl, after which 
2 3 
it is in turn deleted by Joe, which is subsequently raised and 
1 
pa.ssiYized. 
Despite this impressive piece of evidence, Postal presents 
a large body of' equally impressive eYidence which points to the 
conclusion that EQUI cannot be cyclical. First, he shows that 
PROIWMrnALIZATIOff must follow some la.st-cyclical or post-cyclical 
rules and must therefore be itself post-cyclical. Then, he lists 
a considerable nwnber of rather peculiar constraints that hold 
for both PRONOMINALIZATION and EQUI, and concludes that an 
important generalization would be miseed if a large number of 
constraints were repeated twice in the grammar. As it would not 
be possible to constrain EQUI after it has applied, the conclusion 
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tha.t NPs that are eventually deleted must be first pronominalized 
in order to participate in the constraints seems re.tner inevi-teble. 
How can '.te then reconcile these two conflicting kinds of evidence, 
that is, how can EQUI be cyclical and non-cyclical at the same 
time? Postal proposes to break down EQUI into t~o parts; a 
cyclical rule called DOOM HARKiliG will mark the ilPs that ;;ill 
eventually be deleted, then unother rule cnlled DOOM ERASURE will 
delete only those NPs that ru.·e both 11doomedtt and pronominal. 
Of-course, a host of problems remain to be solved. The 
precise statement o:f DOON MARKING and DOOM EPJ,.SURE is no simple 
matter, and it is not even clear that there should be only one 
rule of DOOM MA..'tKIWG. ;,foreover, the status of PRONOHI.NALIZATION 
itself is not clearly established in the gre.rr.me.r. 2oss (19G7) 
claimed that it was a cyclical rule, while Lakof~ proposed that 
it be partly stated as output conditions. Postal 1s treatment of 
EQUI req_uires that Pronominalization be a. post-cyclical (or la.st 
cyclical) rule, There is of course no a priori Justification for 
believing that all pronominal forms arise through the operation of 
a single rule or set of conditions. Be this as it may, Postal 1s 
evidence suggests rather strongly that the deletion of complement 
subjects cannot be handled by one rule, and that at least two are 
required, 
Returning now to point (E) above, we recall Pasta.l's Marked 
Verb Proposal, according to which promise vould be marked for 
subject-subject coreferentiali t;t, persuade for direct object-
subJ ect coreferentiality, tell _for indirect object-stibject 
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coreferentia.lity, and ask for an of,-phra.se-subJect coreferentiality. 
There are no a priori grounds for considering this proposal wrong. 
However, there a.re some reasons for suspecting that the above 
ite~s are not totally unrelated, as a semantic notion like 
"intention" seems to be involved in all of them. In a somewhat 
ve.gue sense, a promise is a statement of intent,. a.n act of persuasion 
cau5es intent in another person, an act of telling or asking is an 
attempt to bring about some intention in another person. If 
syntactic justifications can be found for representing the above 
verbs •,rith a shared element, we may hope that the four separate 
const?'.aints •.till reduce to only one constraint that could be imposed 
on that element. 
I.n chapter t·..o, I discuss the pertinen~~ features of a theory of 
language ~hich makes such a.n endeavor possible. In chPpter three, 
I in~uire in~o the possibility of formulating a solution along 
the lines suggested above. 
Footnotes 
1r assume Robin Lekoff's {1968) phrase structure rules for the 
expansion of relatives and comple~ents respectively: 
NP ___, NP (S) 
NP --- HS 
2Postal does not define the kind of infinitive.ls that he has 
in mind, but I assume that he means 11 subJectless infinitival clauses 
tha.t originate as objects of the immediately higher verb." 
31 am using "emotive" in the sense of Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1968). 
4r am indebted to Perlmutter (1968) for those. althou~h he 
uses them in a different context. 
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5The problem of whether there should be a modal in imperatives 
in general and what that m6dal should be is a vexed one in the 
literature. Klima (196u) argued for a will, on the basis of tags 
like won't you? that can follow imperatives. Bolinger (1967) 
pointed out that other tags were possible too. Lees (1964) 
argued for a phonologically zero morpheme II-1P, which ITTES 
collapsed with SJC (subjunctive) that is necessary in embedded 
clauses. The latter required a SJC morpheme to ensure the 
operation of certain rules, and in order to supply the correct 
semantic interpretation. With respect to the semantic interpre-
tation, the status of SJC seems to me very similar to that or Q 
that had been proposed by Katz and Postal (1964) for questions, 
However, ir embedded questions and conunar.ds ate embedded to u 
higher verb of questioning or command, and if unembedded sentences 
of this kind are viewed as embedded to abstract r,erformatives ~ith 
the same pr?perties, the need .for e. Q or L\fP morpheme in th.e 
underlying structure of the embedded clause vanishes. Should such 
a rr.orpheme turn out to be i,ndispensable for the operation of 
transfonne.tional rules, we might resort to the undesirable solution 
of introducing it transforme.tionally and subsequently deleting it. 
It rr~ght be argued that a SJC would still be necessary for verbs 
like say that are ambiguous T..rith respect to imperative force, and 
in a theory like that outlined by Katz and Postal, this would indeed 
be required. If we adopt, ho~ever, the suggestion made by Weinreich 
(1966), Mccawley (1967) and others, tha.t u:1~~rlying structures 
should contain unambiguous terminal elements {lexemes or.semantic 
primes), an SJC in the embedded clause becomes redundant. 
6
'l'he notion of 11 dee:p-structure constraint" is extensively 
discussed in Perlmutter (1968). He argues that obligatory core-
ference of NPs of the ty:pe discussed above cannot be handled 
trensformationa.lly--as Lakoff (19G5) had contended--for the 
coreference relation is not always the same at the stage at which 
EQUI applies. It appears to be the same, however, at a deeper 
level, and Perlmutter assumes there is no need to state it ate. 
stage later than the deep structure. One of the ~ost convincing 
pieces of evidence comes from Bulgarian, where coreference relations 
must be satisfied but EQUI is precluded; therefore, there is no 
way to state the restrictions tra.nsformationally) unless one is 
willing to introduce 11 null transformations." 
CHAPTER TWO 
PRE-LEXICAL TRANSFORMATIONS AND SEMANTIC PRIMJ~S 
Some Objections to the Standard Theory 
A number of fundamental assumptions of the Standard 'l'heory of 
transformational grammar--as it emerges from Katz and Postal (1964) 
and Chomsky (1965)--have been questioned in recent years by Bach, 
Gruber, Lakoff, Mccawley, Postal himself, and others, who proposed 
a new approach to linguistic theory that has come to be known as 
j ... 
Generative Semantics. Among the Standard Theory tenets with which 
the Generative Semanticists took issue was the claim that there 
exists a significant level of deep structure lying at the boundary 
between semantics and syntax and at which significant generalizations 
needed to be stated. 'rhe Generative Semanticists' critic ism contends 
that the deep structure of the Standard Theory resembles the phonemic 
level of American structuralism in that both complicate the 
description unnecessarily and, if their definition is taken literally, 
they 	make incorrect claims. 
Deep structure was defined by the following properties: 
(A) 	 Lexical insertion takes place at this level. 
(B) 	 Deep structures serve as inp~t to both the transformational 
and 	the semantic components. 
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(C) Selectional and co-occurrence restrictions are statable 
at this level, 
(D) Fundamental grammatical relations, like sub1fect and 
object a.re definable at this l.evel. 
(A} is simply incorrect as it stands. Mccawley (1967) 
points out that i terns like former and latter, which depend on the 
order of items in sur:f'ace structure cannot possioly be inserted in 
dee:;:, structure. iie al$o cites o.n example e;ivert to him by Ross. 
which showa that personal pronouns cannot all be inserted at the 
same point, due to e.n English rule ~hich obligatorily collapses tvo 
conjoined superficially identical ~Ps: 
(1) 	 a. Do you knou John and Mary? He and she are a 
doctor end a teacher respectively. 
b, Do you know John a.."ld Bill? f*He anct he J are
l_They 
a doctor and a teacher respectively. 
Cases like the above, as well as phenomena like suppletion and 
in£lection, require that the Standard Tneory be suppiemented with 
a second lexical look-up, if it is to meet standards of obse:r,ational 
adequacy. However, if nothing else is done, higher levels cf 
adequacy will not be reached. 
Lakoff (l969) and Postal (1970) ~rgue at great length that 
important generalizations would be miss~d if all lexical items 
were regarded as non-complex and unstructUt"ed. Lakoff shovs that 
~issue.de is subJect to the same derivational constraints as 
~rsuade not, and that the facts do not need to be stated twice if 
the .former is a.1.lo· .. ed to be inse:r;ted in place of the latter. Postal 
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sho...,s that a considerable number of :restrictions •.1hich must be 
stated for the verb remind follo-.,r ra.ther naturally from restrictions 
that are independently needed for the predicates strike and like. 
It appears that certain generializations can only be eaptured if w-e 
allov items to replace other items. 
Tnere is one difficulty here, as the replaced and the 
re:placing items cannot be of the same formal nature. Indeed, lexical 
items oI'ten have idiosyncratic properties, and if both the replacing 
and the repla.ced items are viewed a.s lexical, the theor:, will 
sometimes make wrong predictions. This difficulty has been 
repeatedly pointed out by the supporters of the 11 lexica.list position. 11 
For example, Chomsky (1967) sho,;.s that verbs and derived nominals 
often exhibit dirferent semantic a.nd syntactic properti.es, and that 
the existence of a verb does not automatically imply the exiatence 
of a nominal and vice versa, However> this ditficultJ vanishes if 
the replaced items a.re abstract constructs with no phonological 
form and exhibiting~ of the semantic and syntactic properties 
of the corresponding lexica.l items, This nev kind of construct is 
called 11the semantic yrime. it T'neref'ore, in positinr; the su:rfat:!e 
verb remind as derived from the semantic primes strike and~, 
the linguist must be careful not to assign to the latter two any 
property of the lex:ioa.l items strike a.nd like which is not a. 
:property of the lexical item remind; a.lso, no idiosyncratic property 
of' the latter should be assigned to the semantic primes) a.sit would 
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be carried over to the lexical items strike and like if they, 
rather than remind, were inserted. 
With respect to (B) and (D) above. it beca.~e apparent to 
researchers attempting to account for an increasingly larp;e body 
of facts, that the structure of the Standard Theory was not 
enough. As the structure was nreceding'1 towards semantic 
representation, there ca.me a moment where it was no longer obvious 
that syntactic deep structure and semantic representation had 
to be kept distinct, Every time the deep structure was brought 
closer to the semantic repre~entation, no need was discovered for 
relating d€ep structure to surface structure by operations other, 
than transformations, If deep structure is indistinct from semantic 
representation, the need £or projection rulrs disappears, and the 
underlying and surface representations can be related by a. homogeneous 
set of operations, namely, transformations. In this way, considerable 
dupli~ation can be avoided. Postal (1970} points out that the 
meaning of ;eork--•..thich is something like 11~.J:EAT THAT COMES FROM PIGS1t __ 
is rep-resented as a set of semantic markers, while the phre.se 11 meat 
tha.t comes from _pigs"--which has presumably the same semantic 
representation--is represented as a tree in deep structure. The 
representing of pork and meat that comes from pi~s with tvo different 
deep structures is a.n unnecessary complication cf the gram.mar. The 
reason is not that the t~o phrases mean the same thing, but that 
pork has to be semantically represented as a tree, for semantic 
representation in terms of unstructured sets of semantic markers 
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hes been shown to be incorrect. Weinreich (1966) pointed out 
that projection rules take e structured tree as input and produce 
a 11hee.p" of semantic markers where all the significant relations 
defined in deep structure are lost. The conclusion seems to be 
that semantic representation must be interns.lly structured, in 
other words, it :nay consist of trees, exactly like the s~mtactic 
deep structure. Thus, a formal dissimilarity bet~een semantic and 
syntactic representations disappears. 
Sobe differences bet~een semantic representations and deep 
structures remain. In the generative sei:la.ntic view, semantic 
representa.tions should resenble logical representa.tions, and would 
thus make use of devices like constants and variables, propositional 
connectives, set symbols and q_uantifiers, predicates, and descrip-
tions of sets a.nd quantifiers. In addition to that, s~ma.ntic 
representations must disti~guish bet~een the descriptions of sets 
and individuals that a.re presupposed a.nd those that are asserted. 
Mccawley (1967) proposes to accomplish this by dividing the meaning 
of an uttersnce into a. 11 proposition11 and a set of nNP-descriptions • 1t 
It appears that the categories and units used in semantic repre-
sentation are not these.me as those that appeared in deep and 
surface structure, as the former makes no use of symbols like VP, 
?P, etc, l-!oreover, the relations defined on semantic configurations 
~re different from those defined by deep and surface structures. 
However, it was shown by people that worked vithin the framework 
of a grammar with a l~vel of deep structure that the relations and 
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categories needed in deep structure itself could not )Je the same 
as those that eppeared on the surface. Lakoff {1965 nnd 1968a) 
sug~ested that categories like manner adver,2. and instrwnental 
adverb be transformationally introduced. Fillmore (19G8) claimed 
that categories like VP a..~d PP were unnecessary in deep structure, 
e.nd that noreover relations like sub1ect and oLject did not belong 
t.o the deep struc-;;ure, as they could not be consistently interpreted 
by the semantic component. Therefore, the fact that the relations 
and categories of the semantic re~resentation differ from those 
found on the surface comes as no difficulty. 
'rii th respect to ( C), Mccawley ( 1968c) reports that he knows 
of no selectional restrictions that depend on purely syntP-ctic 
information, and that lle knows of no semantic information that 
could r.ot play a pa.rt in selectional restrictions. As e.n illustration 
of the foluter claim, consider that there is no English verb that 
req1~ires a subject pronornineliz.able as she; as an illustration of 
the latter, consider how specific the semantic content of the subject 
of a verb like diagonalize has to be. 
The Semantic Primes 
The semantic primes, which label the terminal nodes of 
underlyin~ trees in Generative Semantics, have not been veriJ clearly 
discussed an:r~·here in the literature. It seems clee.r enoue,:h that 
they need not be logical or psychological primes; they t.tust ·oe 
primes only with respect to the functioning of the r.rarnmar. Thus, 
althoUF.h some unit of meaning which ve tentatively postulate to be 
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a prime may be further broken down i~to logically more elementary 
concepts. we are nqt justified into post~lating the la.tt.er as 
primes unless they can be shown to have some independent linguistic 
reali t;y {i.e., unless they a.re independ~ntly needed somewhere else 
ill the grammar). 
The best way to define the primes that I can think or is to 
represent them a.s bund).es of' s~a.ntic and syntactic properties • 
.Among the sem/3,Iltic properties, there would have to be theoretical 
constructs not too different from Katz &Fodor's $emantic markers. 
'.rhis is of course necessary for the operation or selectional 
restrictions vhich require s.emantic information, as I pointed out 
above. Therefore, the semantic primes are elementary in the 
sense that they do not exhibit internal str::::ture--i.e., they must 
not be represented as trees--but tl1ey may be complex :t'l"om a. ·set-
theoretical point of view. This decision is similar to decisions 
in other approaches to transformational. grammar. The prime 
constructs in Fillmore 1 s Case Grammar are the deep cases, but 
these are not unanalyzable; since they carry features like +Animate 
(Agent a.nd Dative) or -/Ulimate (Locative a.nd Instrumental), 
In addition to the semantic tree that serves as input to the 
trans~onnational component, the meaning of a sentence has to consist 
. 1
of a. set of presuppositions., of topic, and focus. Moreover; the 
lexical items themselves may contribute to the meaning of sentences~ 
since they may have idiosyncratic properties ~hich cannot be 
carried over to the primes they replace (on the assumption that the 
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primes a.re 	universal, not languaRe-s~ecific). 2 
Lexical Insertion 
We have seen tha.t lexical insertion cannot be COl"ried out a.t 
a single point, in the Generative Semantics ~rWlll'l!atical model. 
Mccawley {1968a} considers where insertion could take place. He 
notes that insertion could not ta.~e place at the end of a derivation, 
for certain operation~ depend on the presence or specific lexical 
items, not only their meaning. This follows .from the ea.rlier 
made observation tha.t lexical items have idios:,ncra.tic properties. 
Thus throw out and eject couJ.d probably repla~e the same semantic 
con~iguration, but only the former can be efrected by the particle 
movement transformation. 
Another possibility that has to be rejected is that all 
lexical items might be inserted et the beginninp, of a. derivation. 
To take a.~ example not given by Mccawley, many transrormations 
depend on the items they af.fect being in the same silllJ)lex sentence, 
and one o.f these is reflexlvization. Consider hovever (3); 
( 3) John 	killed himself', 
which Mccawley would 	represent as i'ollows: 
( 3 t) s 
Prouosition 	 ifP-description :X1--=-r----	 IcAunE x1 s 	 Xl is called ''John" 
----' BECOME 	 S 
~
NOT S 
~
AI.IVE x1 
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Reflexivization cannot apply to this configuration, for the· two 
instances of x1 are not in the same sentence. Ir ve tried to 
modify the reflexiviza.tion -rule so that it apply to this confi~a-
tion, the conditions for its application would become :practically 
unstatable. It is therefore necessary to have a rule of PREDICATE-
RAISING which adjoins a predicate to the next higher predicA.te. '?:'his 
rule causes the S-node .,.hicn dominated the raised predicate to be 
deleted by Ross• tree-pruning principle (1966}. If PREDICATE-
• 
RAlSING applies three times, the two inste.nces of X1 ..ri 11 be in the 
sa.me sentence and rei'lexi'liza.tion will apply. Now, lexical insertion 
mu:;;;t follov PREDICATE-RAISJJ:rG, ·oecause the material to be re:placed 
is discontinuous before that rule applies. After it has applied, 
the proposition looks as follows; 
(3") Proposition 
CAUSE BECOME NOT ALIVE 
and the lexiceJ. item kill may .:-eplace the semantic mate:rial dominated 
by the circled. node. The items John and himself' will have to 
await the rule of reflexivization, otherwise the two instances of 
x1 wouJ.d be replaced by John a.nd a new lexical look-up would be 
necessary after reflexivization enyvey. Since refle.xivization is 
a relatively late rule--i t must follow, for example, SUBJECT-RAISirm--
it follows that some items would be inserted ouite late in a 
deriva.tion . 
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The PREDICATE-RAISING rule must be optional and be a.llowed to 
aprly any number of times. Assuming a configuration similar to (3 1 ) 
except that the two SJ1Tibols denotinP' indiv-iduals are not coreferential, 
if PREDIGATE-MISIUG does not apply, a possible output of the 
derivation will be 
(4} Jo:i.n caused Bill to become not alive. 
If it applies once, the output vill be 
(5) John causec Bill to become dean. 
Ji it applies twice; the output will he 
{G) John ca.used Bill to die. 
and if it applies three times, the derivation will result in 
(1) John killed Bill. 
It must be pointed out that the lexico~ !'leed not necessarily 
contain lexical items that cnn be ~atched vith structures resultinG 
from the free application of ?REDICATE-R.-'\ISING. However, as Mc:Ca•.1ley 
points out, it is not necessary to constrain this rule so that ell 
the structures resulting from its operation be matched by the 
specifications for some lexical item. In fact, it might be 
suspected that such ao endeavor would prove impossible. All we 
need is a condition that derivational outputs are well-formed only 
if aJ.l their te:::-minal elements are lexical items. 
Some Syntactic Arguments for Lexical Decomposition 
Notice that (3•) schematically represents the meaning of (3), 
but some independent justification for its existence must be found, 
for ~e do not want to assert that any definition of an ite~ 
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represents its Wlderlying representation. Such independent 
Justification has been attampted, and I shall cite a few ~xe.mplee. 
{a) The almost a.rgµment 
McCavley mentions a suggestion of Jerry Morge.n's to the 
effect that the sentence 
(8) John almost killed Harry 
is tm-e~ ways ambiguous, e.s it can µe una~rstood in one of the 
following ways : 
(9) a. John al.most did something that would have 
killed Harry. 
b. John 4id something that came close to causing 
Harry to die. 
c. John did something that brought Harry close to 
death. 
According to Morgan~ the ambiguity can be explained by assuming that 
almost is generated at three different points, and a prelexice.l 
transformation raises it into a higher clause. Schematically, and 
disregarding all irrelevant details, the underlying structures of 
the three senses of {8) would be: 
(10) 	 a. almost CJohn ca.used Harry to become not alive] 
b, John caused al.most CHa.rry become not aliveJ 
c. John caused Harry to )::iecome almost Cnot aliveJ 
This argument, alth.ougb plausible, seems to me vitiated by 
the fa.ct that 
(11) John didn't kill Ha~ry. 
is also three ways smbiguous, as it can be para.phrased as 
(12) 	 a. John didn't do anything that would have ee.used. 
Harry to die. 
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(12) 	 b. John did something -:.hich didn't C!.\Use Barry 
to die (because, e,p,. the bullet missed 
Harry), 
c. 	 John did something that should have resulted 
in Harr;'s· death but didn 1 t (a.s he 
didn•t hit a vital spot). 
However, 	the ambiguity ce.nnot be explained by postulating the 
underlying structures 
(13) 	 a. not [John caused Harry to become not e.liveJ 
b, John caused not [Harry become not alive] 
c. J;oim ca.used Harry to become not [not alive] 
for these would result in sentences me.e...'ling roug.'-11:r 
(14) 	 a. It is not the case thet John killed Harry. 
b. John 	prevented Harry from dying. 
c. John 	resurrected Harry. 
It is apdarent that the ambiguity of (11) need not be explained 
by NEG-raising, for (14) a exhibits exactly the same kind of 
ambiguity. Therefore, the ambiguity of (8} is not explained by 
(10), and the ambiguity of (8) does not prove that needs to 
be represented as complex. ?fotice tha.t (9) c and (lO) c are 
par~r,hrases only if John's act is understood as nonintentiono.l, 
If it is intentional, the tvo structures exhibit the followinP. 
slight difference in meaning: 
{15) 	 a. John set out to kill Harry. but only wounded 
him grievously (which is a possible 
paraphrase of (8)). 
b. 	 John set out to wound Har:i:;r grievously, and 
achieved his goal (which is a possible 
paraphrase of (10) c, but not or (8}). 
I think ve can conclude that the rule of almost-raisin; does not 
exist , and that the similarity in meaning between the three senses 
of (8) and {lO)a-c results from nea.r-synooymy of underlying forms. 
{b) The Adjectival Degree Argument  
La.\off points out that  
(16) The 	phys i cist hardened the ~etal, 
should 	have the follo~ing underlying structure {schematically): 
(16•) 
I~l~ ____, 	 --------
D I{ 	 V }IP 
I 	 I I I 
the physicist CAUSATIVE 
NP 	 VP ----S2 ---I I 
"' V 
I 
Ii? VP HCHOAT!VE -----~3 ---_...,--'-...._ ~
Det l'l V A 
I 	 I I I 
the metal be hard 
In order to prove that s3 ·. exists, La.kofi' points out that (16) is 
ambiguous between the meanings: 
(17) n. 	 The physicist caused the metal to become hard. 
b. The physicist caused the metal to become harder. 
This ambiguity follows naturally from the property of certain 
adjectives of alloving a co~pa.rative degree, if ve assume that the 
representation of harden contains e.n adjective. 
{c) The it s..rgu!Jlent 
In order to prove that S2 exists in (16'), Le.koff' points out 
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that ve can say 
(18) 	 The physicist finally hardened the metal, but it 
took him five yee.rs to bring it about. 
The antecedent of the second it, he claims, can only be the 
complement of the causative verb. Notice, however, some difficulties 
that arise in connection ~ith (19). 
(19) 	 The phy~icist managed to harden the piece of ~old, 
but it could also have happened to a piece of 
silver. 
I find (19) at least three ~ays umbig1~ous, as the antecedent of it 
can be either the inchoative harden, or the string the physicist 
harden, or the physicist manage [the physicist he.rdenJ, The way 
the rule that produces such instances of it is formulated by Lakoff, 
it is an everywhere rule that pronominalizes sentences. However, 
as Chomsky points out in !!Deep Structure, Surface Structure and 
Semantic Interpretation" (fn. 24), none or the antecedents of it 
in (19) are sentences. In order to account ror the :first reedinp; 
of (19), it must be allowed to refer to constituents other then 
sentences; but in the remaining two readinP,s of (19)> the antecedents 
a.re not even constituents e.t any stage of a derivation (in anybody's 
grammar , a.s far a.s I know) . 
Chomsky takes this evidence as sufficient for concluding that 
there is no rule of Pronominalization, and that pronouns should be 
generated directly by the base component of the grammar, their 
antecedent being determined by later rules of semantic interpretation. 
Jackendorf, in his dissertation, goes one step further and proposes 
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that transformations not be allowed to perform deletions. 
Of course, if Pronominalization is allowed to reduce non-
constituents, the constraints on the rule become extremely complex 
and hard to state. But it is not absolutely necessary to increase 
the power of Pronominalization in this way. I am aware of two 
proposals for deriving pronouns like the it in (19) transformationally 
while maintaining the requirement that the antecedent of a pronoun 
be a constituent. One such proposal belongs to Ross (1969b) and 
rests on the notion of "sloppy identity." According to the latter, 
two strings differing only in commanded pronouns may be considered 
identical for the purposes of deletion (pronominalization being 
considered a special case of deletion). Sloppy identity enables 
commanded pronoun which does not appear in the first. The second 
us to analyze (19) ~s (19'): 
(19') The physicist managed to harden the .E..i~ of 
gold, but the physicist managed to harden it; 
could have h·appened to a piece of silveri, 
as the two underlined strings differ only in·that the second contains 
) 
a 
string is a constituent and the transformational version of 
Pronominalization is salvaged. The second proposal which circumvents 
the need for base-gener.ated pronouns is due, I believe, to Postal, 
and consists in the eliminat.ion of all many-place predicates from 
underlying structures. The'base g~nerated only·one-place predicates 
which may be put together by later transformations. In this way, 
any string can be made a constituent at some stage of a derivation. 
G-50  
(d) The Adverbial Scope ArP,urnent 
Another argument that supports the lexical decomposition of 
cau::;atives concerns the abilit.y of adverbs to modify either the 
IJ:lCHOATIVE or the verbal prime immediately beloi, the latter 
(henceforth the Intermediate Predicate}. 
An example in which a. time adverb refers to an Intermediate 
Pre,:iicate is mentioned by Binnick (1 reproduce it below as (20e.)): 
(20) a, He was jailed for four years. 
where the scope of the adverbial phrase for four years is the under-
lined string in (20) b, 
{ 20) b . Xi CAUSED C nrcHOATIVE [~l was Jailed. for four 
yearsJJ. 
The scope of the a.d11erb in (20) c, d, e is similar to that in (20) a.: 
(20) c. He wounded her grievously. 
d. He broke the glass to smithereens. 
e. He browned the cake lightly. 
As I pointed out above, the scope of adverbs ma.y be delimited 
by INCHOATIV:E, i.e., it may consist of the complement of the prirr.e 
CAUSE, as in (20) f, g: 
(20) f. He opened the door smoothly. 
g. lie tau~ht her Spanish quickly, 
It should be pointed out that (20) f, g are ambiguous, as the scope 
of the adverb may be either the complement of CAUSE, or the entire 
sentence. 
(e} The Quantifier Scone .Argument 
Bach (1968) notes that (21) is a.mbiguous betveen a specific 
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and a non-specific reading of a rich man, and proposes to distinp,uish 
the two readings by having an existential quantifier p,enerated at 
different points in the underlying structure, as in (22) a, b: 
(21) She wants to marry a rich man. 
(22) a. There is a rich man and she wants to marry him. 
b. She wants there to be a rich man and that she 
marry him. 
Give~ the validity of (22) a as a paraphrase of (21), Bach proposes 
to explain the ambiguity of (23)--which parallels that of (21)--by 
decomposing look for as tg to find and allowing the generation of 
the quantifier at different points in underlying structure. The 
two readings of (23) would then be analyzed as (24) a, b, which is 
analogous to ( 22) a, b. -
I 
(23) She 	is· looking for a rich man. 
(24) 	 a. There is a rich man and she is trying to find 
him. 
b. 	 She is trying there to be a rich man and that 
she find him. 
We can see that Bach establishes a proportion, namely, "as (22) 
is to (21), (24) is to (23); and as (23) is to (21), (24) is to 
.(23) 11 , which, if sound, would support his proposal for the 
decomposition of look for. Unfortunately, there are two flaws in 
Bach's argument, which make it·impossible to test the validity of 
his lexical decomposition claim. 
First, (22) band (24) bare not parallel, as the former is a 
well-formed string while the latter.is not (in view of the fact that 
try, unlike~' is a COSUB). 
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Secondly, both (22) a and (22) bare incorrect paraphrases of 
(21}. Before shoving this, I $hall replace (21) and (22) by (21'} 
and (22') respectively, as (21) is not two-way, but three-'ila.Y 
ambiguous, and this triple ambiguity is not directly relevant to 
the Specific/Non-Specific distinction which Bach is tryin;;; to 
account for. Indeed, on the Specific (i.e., referential)reading, 
the NP a rich man is in a position of referential opacity, and 
the description may belona, to either the subject or the speaker of 
the sentence. Thfs problem does not a.rise in (2l 1 }, where the 
subject and the speaker are one and the same person. 
(21 1 ) I want to rnarrJ a rich girl. 
(22t) a. There is a rich girl and I want to marry her. 
b. ! want ther~ to be a ~~ch girl and t~at r 
marry her. 
That the specific reading of {21') is not a ~enuine paraphrase of 
(22') a becomes clearer ~hen we negate the two sentences: 
(21
(21 11 ) rt is not the case that I va.11t to ma.rt"'_r a 
(snecific) rich girli. 
(22") a. It is not the case that there is a (specific) 
rich gir11 and that I ~ant to marr.r heri. 
11 
) is true just in case I want to marry her1 is false, vhile 
(2211 ) a. is true just in case there is a (speciric) rich ~irl. and 
·1 
want to mar;nr: her1 a.:re not both true. IIotice that {21") , unlike 
( 22 11 ) a., necessarily commits the speeJcer to the belief that _there 
is a. (specific) rich girli is true. Its both (21') and its denial 
(e.g., (21")) cornmit the speaker to the belief that the rich girl 
I 
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in question exists, ·.te m!l.,'.r conclude that 1:1.ere is a. (snecific) rich 
girli constitutes a presupposition of the Specific (i.e., referential) 
reading of (21'), and is not a part of its meaning, as Each claims. 
With respect to the Non-Speci:~ic reading of ( 21 1 }, we can see 
that it is not a paraphrase of (22 1 ) b applying the test of negation: 
(21' 11 ) It is not the case that I want to mar:rJ e. rich 
girl (whoever she may be). 
(22 111 ) b, It is not the case that I want there to be a 
rich girl c~·hoever she ma.y be) and that 
· I marry her. 
(21 1 ") is true if I Yent to ll':}l,_!r'/ a rich girl is false, while (22'") b 
is true if I want there to be a rich girl and I want to marry her 
are not both true. 
It is interesting to note that no presunposition as to the 
existence of at least one rich girl in the world accompanies the 
:ron-Speci!'ic reading of ( 21 1 ). Therefore, (22 1 ) b is even more 
incorrect than (22 1 ) a as a paraphrase of (21 1 ), for the statement 
there is a rich girl is neither a presupposition nor a pa.rt of the 
meaning of Hon-Specific (21'). In order to convince ourselves that 
the assertion of the latter.does not commit the speaker to the 
belief that there exists {at least) one rich girl in the world, 
consider the following situation: 
John sees Bill scrutinizing the pavement carefully 
and asks him what he is doing. Bill answers: 11 I 
am looking for a 100 dollar-bill." John joins Bill 
in his search, but, after a couple of fruitless hours, 
asks him: "Are :rou sure you lost one hundred dollars 
here?", at which Bill replies: "Did I ever tell you 
that I lost a 100 dollar bill? I merely said I vas 
looking for one!" 
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7he humor results from the fact that John was thinkin~ of a 100 
dollar-bill specifically while Bill was thinking of it non-
fically. It is clear that Bill hnd no reason to presuppose 
that there was any money lying around, he merely hoped he might be 
lucky (perhaps because he h2.d found money in that place before, 
or for some other reason). :::n fact, :ie could have se.id (23): 
( 23} I am 	 looking for a. ?,100 bill, a.l though I am not 
sure that there is one to be found. 
We :lave seen the.t there is a. rich girl is neither asserted nor 
presupposed by llon-SpecHic (21 1 ). One might be tempted to believe 
that the existential statement constitutes the deleted protasis or 
a. conditiona..l, so that the source of .Non-Specific {21 1 ) is son:ethin~ 
like ( 24), but this would be b.correct, in view of the non-synonymity 
cf (21 1 ) 	 and (24)--~hich becom~s clearer under negation in (25), 
(24) I ~ant to marry a rich girl, if there is one. 
(25} a. I don 1 t 'n"a.'lt to marry a rich p;irl. 
b. 	 ?I don't vant to marr,/ a rich girlt if there is 
one. 
The conclusion seems to emerge that the:re is no trace of a.n 
existential statenent in the underlying representation of Non-
Specific ( 21 t}. We recall that an existential statement turned out 
to occur in the underlying representation o~ Specific (21t), but 
as a ~resupposition only. Therefore, Bach's Quantifier scope 
argU.tnent is basically invalid nnd ce.nnot be used to support the 
decomposition of look for as .!!:;:(___:!;O fiE!!:., despite the intuitive 
appeal of the nronosa.l. 
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Conclusions 
In the preceding pages, I have considered the merits and the 
demerits of a number of arguments advanced in favor of the lexical 
decomposition hypothesis.· We have seen that some ar~uments were 
questionable and that even the stronger ones were not conclusive. 
Despite this, I shall assume the essential validity of Generative 
Semantics in what follows. In particular, Chapter III will make 
proposals for the decomposition of some of the COSUB verbs. I 
s_hall attempt to offer semantic and syntactic justification for 
the primes I introduce. 3 
Footnotes 
1some interesting problems arise in thi~ connection. 
Consider, for exampl~, the question ¥,hether topicalization should 
be allowed to change meaning. One of the pairs of sent~.nces 
treated as transformationally derived in Case Grammar is 
(i) a. Bees swarm in the p,arden. 
b, The ~arden swarms with bees. 
However, they are not paraphrases, for }:, but not .!!_, implies 
that the garden is full of bees. The problem is whether to 
attribute the difference to topicalization or to a distinction 
between the underlying representations of the two sentences. 
2The type of idiosyncratic semantic lexical feature that 
comes most easily to mind is that which Weinreich (1966) called 
"transfer-feature". Thus, it seems to me that the adjectives · 
addled and rotte.E,_ are synonymous on at least one reading, except 
that the former is said of either an egg or a head while the latter 
can be predicated of a larger class of objects. It would not do 
to set up two separate primes one of which would be predicated of 
either eggs or heads, for there is no guarantee that a prime of the 
latter type would be needed in any language other than Enp;lish. 
If, however, we want.to represent all of the meaning in the under-
lying structure and prevent lexical insertion from contributing 
semantically, we must require that ~ddled be inserted for a 
configuration like NOT IN GOOD CONDITION plus the configuration 
SAID OF Al{ EGG OR HEAD • 
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3My justification will be essentially limited to the 
Intermediate Predicates. CAUSE is hard to justify in COSUBs, as 
one of the best available tests--the one involving adjectival 
degree--is inapplicable. As for TRY, I do not know of a satis-
factory test. 
CHAP.l'ER THREE 
THE SUBJECT-SUBJECT PROPOSAL 
Semantic Arguments for COSUB-Deccrn.uosition 
In this chapter, I take up Postal's Marked Verb Proposal, 
which I wish to c1aim misses a generalization. I shall attempt 
to show that the correct controller of most (possibly, all) COSUB 
verbs can be invariably specified as the subject of the sentence 
immediately above the deletee in underlying structure, provided 
the lexical decomposition hypothesis of genPrative semantics is 
adopted. 
At rirst sight, the COSUB verbs look like a rather hetero-
geneous collection, Among them, we fin4 verbs of promising, of 
command~ of requ~st, and a large number of causatives. According 
to Karttune.n' s taxonomy, some are imp1icativee, some are IF-verbs, 
_ some are ONLY-IF verbs, and some are neither; This latter fact 
should not be too distressing, however, for there is evidence 
that the COSUBs are largely independent of Karttunen 1 s classification. 
Thus, the Subject-~ubject Proposal in effect makes the claim that 
ror any lexically decomposed COSUB verb, the Intermediate Predicate 
is also a COSUB. We can ea.sily convince o~selves that a COSUB 
verb and its corresponding Intermediate Predicate need not bP.lon~ to 
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the same class, in Karttu.'1en 1 s system (for a schematic presentation 
of the latter, see chapter one, page 28). For example! few people 
would dispute { I think) that {1} c s.n be naturally analyzed as {2) : 
(1) I enabled John to leave. 
{2) I caused John to come to be able to leave, 
Notice that !3-ble is- an OHLY-IF verb, but enable is not, Indeed, 
consider ( 3): 
(3) a. *John was not able to lenve, but he left anyhow. 
b, 	 I did not enable John to leave, but he left 
anyhow. 
(3) a bplies tha.t John did not leave, ;;hile no implication e.s to 
what John did follows from the assertion of (3) b, 
On the other hand, there a.re cases vhen a causative COSUB 
and its corresponding Intermediate Predicate must belon~ to the 
same Karttunenian c1Bss. This seems to be the case for th"' TF-
causatives (but see footnote 4). 
I suggested above (chanter one, page 27) that CDSUB verbs 
may share the semantic feature of being oriented towards future 
actions exclusively. If this is correct, the COSUE verbs vill turn 
out to be a. se!Jlantica.lly homogeneous class. !fotice that the COSUB 
property itself appears to be violated in some cases. Thus, althou~h 
(5)-(7) are unacceptabl~, (8)-(10) are perfectly O.K. 
(5) *I forced John for Man• to go. 
(6) *I e..m able for my father to pilot a pla.ne. 
(7) *I persuaded Mary for Jill to leave, 
{8) I intend for Mary to leave. 
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( 9) I asked Mary that Sarah should leave. 
(10) I promised Bill that John would leave. 
Perlmutter makes a rather convincine: argument that in the above 
cases the complement is in fact embedded inside a sentence whose 
predicate is ~ or get and whose sub,ject is coreferential with 
some HP in the matrix sentence, Apart from the t'act that this 
provides the correct semantic interpretation, PerL~utter advances 
four syntactic arguments, two of which I mentioned in chapter one, 
pages 22-23. For. ease of reference, I list all foUl' below. 
Perlmutter points out that ~e ~ere misunderstood is ambiguous 
between a one-time e.nd a durative meaning, but that only the former 
is possible if the sentence is embedded to the verb get. The same 
lack of ambiguity, suggesting an interveninb get-sentence, is 
observable if the sentence is embedded to any of the mfd.n verbs in 
(8)-(10). Another good argument is that these verbs do not embed 
statives, but an embedded nassivized stative is correct, e.g.: 
(11) a. *I intend to know the answer. 
b. I intend to be known as 11 the scourge." 
which becomes explicable if we derive {11) b from (12) 
(12) I intend·to get people to know me as "the scourge." 
for get--and causatives in general--is not a COSUB verb. 
His third argument is that the passivized agent of a verb 
like misunderstand can only be a collective noun or a plural but 
not a singular or a conjunction of singulars both Yhen the matrix 
verb is~ or vhen it is one of those in (8)-(10) (see example (28) 
in chapter one). The difficulty with this constraint is that it 
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seems to be highly restricted dialectally (I have in fact been 
unable to locate even one informant willing to agree with the 
pa.:radigm in (28), chapter one). 
Perlmutter's fourth argument is probably wronF;, He points 
out that we do not find certain "emot i 1,e" a.dYerbs in the complements 
of~. and that this restriction is shared by the COSUH verbs 
vhen embedding a passive and wher. the deep-structure COGUB condition 
ls apparently violated, e.g.: 
{13) *We got the doctor to exa.mine him cleverly. 
(14) *We intend to be exa.-nined cleverly. 
However, (14) proves nothing, ror the restriction holds even when 
the complement is active, and there is no reason to susr,ect an 
intervening in (15): 
(l5) *The doctor intends to examine us cleverly. 
I think that emotive adverbs are barred with COSUB ~.erbs in p;eneral, 
and causatives like get fall in this category. 
AB I pointed out earlier, there a.re nevertheless two, possibly 
three, good arguments, which support the semantic intuition of an 
intervening get fairly well. 
The problem to be considered next is whether it is possible 
to decompose the critical verbs in a natural way vith the result 
that COSUB verbs would be explained by the Sub,Ject-Sub,ject Proposal 
in relation to a small number of Intermediate Predicates. We have 
seen that intend is a COGUB verb, and there are good grounds to 
suppose that a prime like IlrTElID is part of the r:iea.ning of Persuade 
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and nror.rlse. Persuade has already been analyzed in the literature 
. as CAUSE TO COME TO INTEND, and I think that e. reasonable analysis. 
of X promises Y.to Sis X CAUSES Y TO KNOW THAT X INTENDS TO S; 
this analysis is not complete, for it does not specify that the 
statement of intention binds X vis-a-vis Y, and this specification 
is absolutely necessary, or the combination CAUSE TO KliOW could be 
replaced by an item like declare, which is not.a COSUB, T"ne problem 
is that I knov of no good way to represent this fact. It seems 
clear to me that the bindin_g of the speaker is not a presupposition, 
but a result of the speech act. Therefore, a complete representa-
tion of the sentence in question would perhaps be X CAUSES Y TO 
KNOW THAT X IUTE?IDS S AlID THEREBY S COMES TO BE BOUND TO Y, or 
possibly X CAUSES XTO COME TO BE BOUND TOY Iri CAUSING Y TO KNOW 
,·. 	 THAT X INTENDS TO S. The difficulty is that the source of the 
in-phrase cannot be represented satisfactorily in the latter pronosal, 
and in the former, it is not clear to me hov the material CAUSE TO 
;· 	
Know together vith the sentence introduced by AliD could be grouped 
together in a non-ad hoc ve::, in order that the item promise be! 
insertable. Disregarding such formal problems for the time beinP,, 
~e notice that the analysis proposed above for nersuade and intend 
removes the need to mark these two items idiosyncratica.lly, since 
both are subject to the subject-subject constraint; that is, the 
complement subjects of both verbs need only be coreferential with 
the subject of the Intemediate Predicate, which is INTEND in both 
cases. Notice that the difficulties mentioned in connection vith 
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the lexical decomposition of oromise need no longer concern us, 
for we can refrain from decomposing nromise and restrict decom-
position to persuade; in this case, the Subject-8ubject constraint 
holds all the same. 
Alternatively, if we do decompose both nromis~ and pet"suade, 
the Subject-Subject constr~int is not the only possible explanati~n, 
for Rosenbaum•s minim~l distance rrinciple is also satlsfied. I 
~refer, however, to retein the Subject-Subject Proposal~ as it 
furnishes something like a semantic explanation, provided that the 
notion of deep (o:r "logical") subject can he satisfactorily defined 
in linguistic theory. As for the minimal distance principle, we 
sa;.r in chapter one, E, that there is no obvious rea:ison why it 
should vork. Put differently, the Sub,ject-Rub,1ect solution :provides 
a.n intuitively satisfactory explanation, while the minimal distance 
proposal offerson.ly a purely formalistic one. 
In a grammar that does not allow lexical decomposition, nersuade 
must be e.naJ:yzed as taking a subject, an object and a complement. 
The object is a necessary category, ror if we view it ns part of 
the complement, •.;e cannot explain why the meaning of the sentence 
changes when this so-called complement is passivized. Rosenbaum 
had a valuable insight when he noticed that persuade and believe 
were different in that r.he pa$sive version of the apparent comple~ent 
of the former, but not of' the latter, fa.iled to be a paraphrase of 
the active. This led him to posit an additional object--coreferential 
vith the complement subject--for uersuade, but not for believe. 
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This surface object captures the information the.t the sub,ject 
acts directly upon the object in achieving its goal, in contra-
distinction with a. ca.usati•re verb like bring about, •,:rhich ~.oes 
not specify who the agent acts on in attainin~ his goal. Given 
the lexical decomposition P,roposa.l for oersua.de, the informa.tion 
that the agent acts directly on the ~atient (vhich ultimately 
becomes a surface object) is caµtured by the fact that the patient 
is the logical subject of nrrEMD, and that rrmrm has no other 
;.· 
non-sentential argument; therefore, the sub,,ect of the higher 
predicate CAUSE can only bring about the situation described by tho 
compl~ment by a.citing on the sub,ject of the intervening INTEND-
sentence. The sub,ject of IUTrum becomes the surfa.~e object of 
fil!rSUade by SUBJECT-RAISrnG and PREDICATE-RAISING. The SUBJECT-
RAISING rule ma.lees it the subject of the higher nrcHOA'fIVE • and. 
on the following cyc_le, the object of the prime CAUSE. The PREDICATE-
RAISING rule groups predicates together, so that deo1de be 
insertable for COME TO INTEiffi and nersuade for CAUSE TO COME TO 
!NTEND, In the semantic representation of bring a.bout, the prime 
CAUSE directly commands the complement ~ithout any intervening 
clause. Therefore, no infonnation is furnished as to who the 
"causer" acted upon. 
It is my claim that eyery COSUB verb has a. semantic repre-
sentation identical or including that of ~ersuade~ except that 
the Intermediate Predicate may be different. That is, every verb 
at issue :ts decomposable e.s CAUSE TO COME TO X, in ...,hieh "X" may, 
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but need not be , INTErm. However, X must exhibit the Sub,j ect-
SubJ ect constraint. This claim is, of course, an empirically 
falsifiable one, and not without difficulties (especially for 
the IF-verbs, as pointed out in footnote 4 to this chapter). 
As for enable, e.llow, and compel, I propose EE ABLE TO, 
BE FF.EE TO ant HAVE TO as Intermediate Predicates respectively, 
Of course, these primes should not be confused with the corresponding; 
lexical forms, and those interested in a definition of the primes 
used in this t~esis can find it in Appendix I. It suffices, at 
this point, to stress that all complex ve~bs with the Intermediate 
?redicate BE .ABLE TO need not have the same meaning. Thus, emnower 
and enable are not synonymous, but the common core of meaning 
includes the information that the surface ob,ject of either verb is 
given the possibility to do something, in the former case, by bein~ 
conferred a necessariJ degree of authority, in the latter, by havinp; 
certain obstacles removed from his path. The :prime BE ABLE TO is 
therefore neutral with respect to the kind of ability its subject 
acquires, 
The prime BE FREE TO is somewhat different from BE ABLE TO 
semantically. The distinction is reflected in the distinction 
between allo~ and enable. In allow, the subject removes from the 
path of the object only those obstacles that depend upon the 
subject~ •.,hi.le in enable, the sub,j ect is understood to have removed 
all the existing obstacles. 
The problems related to HAVE TO are discussed in footnote 4 to 
this chapter. 
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IF-causatives must, I believe, be distin~ished with respect 
to the degree of resistance on the pa.Tt of the patient that the 
agent had to overcome. The reluctance of the patient must somehov 
b~ represented in the semantic representation or in the features 
of the lexical items. I have not investigated whether this 
information should be given at the semantic or lexical level. 
There are undoubtedly specifications that must be considered 
idiosyncratic and given lexically, For example, causative~ 
ba.s the special property that coreferentiality of its subject to 
its complement subject results in oddity, but only if the predicate 
of the complenent is non-stative. Thus, (16) is odd, a.lthoup,h 
(17) is not: 
(16) ?I had myself open the door. 
{17) I had myself smeared with mud all over. 
This property of have is surprising, as causatives exhibit no 
coreferentic.lity restrictions in eeneral (it is quite all right to 
say I made myself write the story~ I forced J_nyself to stay awake, 
althcugh I comoelled myself to look at the ..E.i£._ture is somewhat funny). 
Tbe reader will notice that I have not yet tackled Postal's 
verbs describing non-declarative verbal performances, like be~. ask. 
reouest, order, etc. The reason is that it is not obvious, on a. 
purely semantic basis, 1;hether the common core of meaning of the 
verbs of request or command should be represented as TRY TO CAUSE 
TO COME TO INTEND or as TRY TO CAUSE TO CO~lli TO HAVE TO. I shall 
attemut to show below that a choice is sugf.?:ested by some syntactic 
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phenomena, but, at this point, whichever solution ve choose vould 
l
satisfy the Subject-Subject requireme!1t. 
An interesting feature that emerged from the above analysis 
is that the semantic primes that immediately co~..ma.nd the com~lement, 
name~ I}fTEND, BE ABLE TO, BE FREE TO, and EAVE TO a!"e close in 
meaning to the non-epistemic reading of the English modals will, 
~' may and must, respectively. This suggests that the core-
ferentiality constraints that ~e have seen a.re, a.f'ter all, modal 
constraints. But my proposal is surely not equivalent to Postal's, 
for he was concerned with surface moda.ls, occurring in actual 
sentences, while I am concerned with abstract predicates with modal 
meaning. Another important difference between Postal 1s proposal 
and mine is that his solution cDvered only -rerbs of oral perf'orme.nce, 
and could not be extended to items like compel vithout considerable 
unnaturalness; in m:, proposal, it is a superficial fact that certain 
'lerbs allow surface mods.ls to appear in th<!lir complements while 
others do not. Moreover, Postal was led by his focusing on surface 
medals to positing a distinction1betveen and~' based on 
the distinction between~ and ought. As I pointed out on page 25, 
this does not constitute a satisfactory explanation, 
The proposal that I am ma.king comes very close to the claim 
made by Robin Lakoff in her dissertationt according to vhich aome 
medals are automatic conse~uences o~ commanding verbs and muat be 
considered meaningless complementizers. It is rather hard to 
decide whether complementizera a.re always meaningless.. The problem 
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is analogous to that of the head noun TI-~act that thP. Kiparskys 
thought had to appear in the deep structure of the complements of 
the so-called "factive predicates. 11 Of course, if the head noun 
is always automatically present, given a certain tYJ>e of matrix 
verb, it can be introduced transformationally. But the Kiparskys 
thought that there are predicates neutral with respect to !activity, 
and that the head noun had to be in the deep structure, in order 
to explain the possibility of having factive as well as non-factive 
meanings, Alternatively, it is possible to claim that there are 
no neutral predicates, and that there are in fact two homophonous 
verbs, one factive and the other non-factive. The distinction is 
sometimes e. subtle one, and not e.t all easy· to make. In the cases 
that interest us here, it is fairly easy to believe that there are 
tvo verbs tell, one a decla.ra.tive and the other aver~ of command~ 
or that there are tvo verbs ~sue.de, a.ns.lyzable as CAUSE TO COME 
TO INTEND and CAUSE TO COME TO BELIEVE. 
But consider now the verb know in the following sentences: 
(18) I know how I should ea.t. 
(l9) I know how to ea.t.~; i' 
/• 
t 	 At first blush, (18) end {19) seem to be pa.ra.:phra.ses a.nd even 
\i. 
, 	 transformational variant::; of a single underlyinp_: structure. I 
think they a.re semantically distinct, a.s the complement of (18) is 
timeless, while that of (19) is future with respect to the time of 
the utterance. In any event, this is supported by syntactic evidence 
when we try to use the pa.st in the cor.iplements: 
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(20) I know how r shoul.d have eaten . 
(21) *I kno•.1 how to nave eaten. 2 
The paradi~ exhibited °O'J (18}-(21) constitutes a clear counter-
example to Posta.1 1 s claim that infinitivals with subjunctive meaninr, 
a.re derived from sentences containing modal:. . One thin~ seems 
clear: the modal snoul~ and the infinitivals are not identical 
complementizei:-s. A rather difficult question that arise3 i!:l 
whether the verb know in (18) and (19) is the sa.m.e verb, the suhtle 
distinction in meanin5 being supplied by the complementizers, or 
whether the complementizers are meaningless and there a.re two 
different verbs~· Some evidence in favor of tlle latter 
possibility is furnished 'oy the verb be a.w8:l'~• which can be 
used to paraphrase (18} but not {19): 
(22) T ,~l how } I hul" t - a!tt aware o~ l_the: WP,:Y in Yhich . s o a ea . 
( 23) ?I am a.we.re of Ghe :; in which] to eat. 
This suggests that there a.re in fact two items ~now, only one of 
~hich is synonymous with be a~are of. 
Notice that the verb show, which r propose to analyze as 
CAUSE TO COME TO KNOW {followinp; Baker}, exhibits the sa.r.ie paradi,u.i 
as know: 
(2~} I shoved John how he should ea.t, 
{25) I shoved John how to eat. 
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(26) I showed John how he should have eaten. 
(27) *I showed John how to have eaten. 3 
{24)-(27) suggests that there are two verbs show, as there are two 
verbs know. This hYJ;>othesis is supported by the existence of the 
item demonstrate, which means CAUSE TO COME TO BE AWPP.E OF, and 
has only the meaning of shov in (24) and (26), but not (25) and 
(27): 
(28) I demonstrated to John how he should eat. 
(29) ?I demonstrated to John hov to eat. 
On the other hand, there is evidence that would lead us to suspect 
that the future orientation of (19) and (25) is imposed by the 
complementizer rather the.n associated with the commanding prime. 
T'nus, although the subject of eat is underg~;oog. as ~, not !, it 
can al.so be understood as a generic. Such ambiguity is not possible 
with items like order and force. 
sn:itactic Arguments for COSUB decomnoait~o?t 
In proposing the lexical decomposition of a number of verbs 
in specific ways, I have used semantic arguments a.lone, However, 
such arguments are not sufficient, for an adequate semantic 
description could also be achieved by assigning semantic markers 
of the Fodor &,Katz variety to lexical items and letting an 
interpretive semantic component ~ork on such markers. In order 
to force a decision between interpretive and generative semantics, 
it is at least necessary to show that syntactic properties ot 
putatively complex lexical items are shared by other items whose 
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meaning we wish to claim is included in that of the more complex 
ones. 
{a) Previousl,1 proposed te~ 
I mentioned, in chapter two, three attempts to prove the 
existence of e. prime CAUSE and one attempt to prove the existence 
of a. prime TRY. In connection with the first three, one is 
ine~plicable to the present situation, as it concerns complements 
whose predicates are adjectives ca.pable of taking degrees, while · 
our complement~,must contain non-stative verbs. Of the remainin~ 
t·...o, the ~t-test is •..n-oniJ, and the one involving pronominaliza-
tion of sentences ~ith ll is somewhat dubious, as I pointed out in 
chapter two. Moreover, this test. cannot be a.pplied to all · 
causatives, for brin& aboE!_ is not identicei to CAUSE. Indeed, 
bring about implies that the situation that came about took some 
time in doing so, and that moreover 11 the ca.user" encountered some 
resistance in bringing about the situation. We can test this by 
noting that verbs that can be decomposed into bring about and a 
complement can also be embedded to a verb like strive. For exe.mple, 
(30) I strove to harden the metal. 
(31) I strove to persuade him to go. 
And indeed, the it-test works with persuade, as we can say! finally 
persuaded ,h?-~ to leaYe, but it took me some sweat to bring it 
~. However, it d.oes not wo.rk with murder and a.ssa.ss~, 
which, according to Lakoff and Mccawley, a.re lexically complex 
causatives: 
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assassinated]{32) ?! 	 the premier, but I do not 
murdered 
~ 
recall when I brought it about. 
The oddity of (32) follovs rather naturally from the oddity of 
(33): 
{33) ?I strove to (::~::inate} the premier.  
That both the it-test and the strive-test fail vith allow  
a.nd e~nower should come as no big surprise, for·one is not supposed  
to encounter too much ~esistance in allowing or empowering someone 
to do something. On the other hand, enable ~asses both tests much 
more successfully, as the reader can convince himself, for precisely 
the opposite reason. Indeed, consider the paradigm exhibited in 
(34): 
?allowed J
(34) a. I ?empowered him to leave, but I do
{ enabled 
not recall 	when I brought it about. 
?allow ]
b. I strove to ?empower him to leave.( enable 
If these difficulties had not existed and if sentence 
pronomine.lization with it had been a precyclic rule only, the it 
test could have been used to decide whether promise should be 
viewed as lexically complex or not. That is, we could have used (35) 
(35) 	 I promised him to leave, but he did not think that 
I meant it. 
to claim that it cannot stand for I LEAVE, nor for I PROMISE Hlr•t 
TO LEAVE, and not even for I WILL LEAVE, for we sa·.t abov.e that 
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moda.J.s cannot be considered as the sources of subjunctive infini-
tives. Therefore, the only possible antecedent for it would 
have been I niTBND CI LEAVEJ, Unfortunately, the antecedent of 
.!_! can just &swell be the surface stTin~ to leave, for if someone 
.,ho just heard me sa:y (35) asks me what didn't he think that vou 
~?, a perfectly good answer is to leave. This is possible even 
if 2.romise is non-complex, for it-s~ntence pronominalization is 
an every.there rule. Notice that the answer to leave is equivalent 
in meaning to the vossible answer that I intended to leave, for 
to leave contains a surface subjunctive which signals the existence 
of a higher {possibly abstract} verb of intention. But given the 
ever:rwhere-character of it-sentence pronominalization, no ~onclusion 
as t.J complexity of oromise is possi'ble. 
It turns out that none of the available tests for proving 
the presence of CAUSE is of much help. This does not mean that 
the GAUSE analysis is wrong, and I believe it is not, but only 
that better tests will have to be fowid. 
I~ connection with the prime TRY, the only argument that I 
have read of in the literature is the one offered by Bach in 
connection with the ambiguity of (36) e.nd (37): 
(36) She is looking for a .!lIB.l1 w~th a big bank account. 
(37) She is trying to find e. ma.n with a big bank 
account. 
As I arg,~ed in chapter two, this argument does not hold much water 
either. In viev of the above, I shall not try to justify my having 
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posited the primes CAUSE, TRY and INCHOATIVE, for I know of no 
good syntactic arguments in their favor. 
(b) Tests for Intermediate Predicates 
I believe that some evidence can be offered in support of 
the so-called nmodal !)rimes 11 (in the cases I consider, the Intermediate 
Predicates). My B.!'guments •,.ill be based on the claim that certain 
properties of the modal primes are shared by the lexical items that 
supposedly contain them. Let it be clearly .understood that such 
evidence is never final; it merely increases the chances that the 
primes in question be contained in the puta.tivel:1 complex lexical 
items. 
I shall offer four pieces of evidence. The first three will 
involve properties common to all four primes and to the corresponding 
complex lexical items. The fourth attempts to distinguish between 
the primes. It is indeed unfortun~te that most arguments do not 
distinguish between the primes; on the other hand, the primes are 
sufficiently distinct semantically for it to be clear that if 
enable is lexically complex, the chances are that its structure is 
CAUSE TO BE ABLE rather than CAUSF, TO INTEI'ffi. 4 
The first argument is that the four primes, as well as the 
putatively complex items, are future-oriented, Therefore, both (38) 
a.nd (39) are ill-formed. 
am able}(38) *I 	 em free to have gone, 
have 
intendD
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fepabled ·] 
(39) 	*lie e.lloved me to have gone . 5  
compelle~ 
{ persuadea 
The second argument is that neither the primes nor the complex 
items can eobed a stative: 
ram able}
(uo) *I l ?...m free to be tall. 
ha.ve 
intend 
me to be tall.{41) *He r=~~~!:! ]
compelled 
\....persuaded 
The third argument is tha.t emotive adverbs cannot occur inside 
the complements of either the pri ll!es or the complex lexical i te?l'.s; 
(oddly
leave - reluctantly •(42} *I l: ~!!.=} to 	 J 
have Lintentionally 
intend 
{43) ~He r:~:!:! Jme to lee.Ve r~:~~tantly J 
compelled ( intentionally 
persuaded ·-
Tbe fourth argument concerns the fact that deep :;tructure corefer-
entiality constraints ce.n sometimes be violated on th.e sur·fa.ce (cf. 
Perlmutter's dissertation}. Such violations were explained by 
Perlmutter by the presence of an intervening sentence vith ~ or 
get where the constraints held and which ~as later deleted. Observe, 
however, that although all the primes and the complex lexical 
items at issue can embed get or let, the sentence tha.t contains one 
of these two verbs carmot always be deleted. It is most interesting 
that the paradigm exhibited by the :primes is paralleled by that of 
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the complex lexical items. It will be noted that the deletion 
of the intervening sentence is sometimes permitted if coreferen-
tiality is superficially satisfied through the passivization of 
the complement, but not when coreferentiality is violated on the 
surfa,ce; 	 Perlmutter noticed that ~ falls in this category. 
In other cases, deletion is out altogether: 
bl [;to be beaten by Jim }(44) I am 	 a e 
*that Martha should leave . 
(45) 	 I [ am ~ee} {to be bee.ten by Jimha.•e *that Martha should lea:Jfto be beaten by JU, J(46) 	 I intend 
that Marthe. should leave ' 
Consider now the behavior of the putatively complex lexical items: 
i*to be bea~en by 	Jim ](47) He enabled me l *that Martha should leave ' 
{48) He 	 1 a.J.lowed } me [to be beaten by Jim 1 
(._compelled tthat Martha. should leav':J • 
("to be beaten by Jim l{49) He persuaded me 1._that Martha. should leavej • 
The correspondence of the tvo paradigms is apparently perfect. 
Observe, however, that som~ problems arise in connection vith 
"Oersuade I as he persuaded me that Martha. should leave does not 
mean he caused me to intend that Martha should leave, hut rather 
he caused me to believe that Martha should leave. I pointed out 
earlier that persuade is an ambiguous iteni, and the fact that 
none of the two sentences in (49) is ambiguous stands in need of 
t; 
~...,,_ __ 
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explanation. A theor.r of language that does not incorporate 
lexical decomposition would note it as an isolated fact about 
nersua.de that, on one reading, it requires the for-to comple-
mentizer and on the other reading, the that complementizer. On 
the other hand, a theor.r of lar.suage that does incorporate 
lexical decomposition would attempt to explain the behavior of 
nersuade on the basis of the behavior of B~IEVE and IUTEND. 
Consider the fir_st sentence in (49), in vhich we only get the 
reading CAUSE TO I?lTE!ID, The reading CAUSE TO BELIEVE is out• 
because there is no sentence *I believe to be beaten by Jim. This 
sentence is ungrazneticel. for tvo reasons: (a) believe with for-to 
disallows its complement to be future-oriented, i.e., it disallows 
a subjunctive infinitival; (b) believe disaJ~ows EQUI and requires 
SURJECT-RUSING ( when the compler.ienti zer is for-to) . Therefore, 
the only way to make the above sentence grammatical is to say I 
believe myself to haYe been beaten b_y Jim. Notice that (b) explains 
why T...,-e do not get he nersuaded me to have been beaten by Jim with 
the reading CAUSE TO BELIEVE: indeed, we recall t~at the surface 
object of persuade is the subject of INTEND or BELIEVE in underlying 
structure, and that it becomes a surface object by RAISING. Hm,ever, 
if the complementizer of BELIEVE is for-to, the subject of have 
been oeaten will have become the object of BELIEVE through the 
application of RAISING on an earlier cycle, A.t this point, BELIEVE 
hes a subject. an object and a complement, and if BELIEVE is to be 
ultimately grouped .nth the higher CAUSE by PREDICATE-RAISING. its 
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three arguments must move alo:ng with it. However, there is no 
rule that ·.rill raise two NPs to object position. That is, ,there 
is no rule that. vill yield *:ii~ E_ersuaded me m.vself to have pepn 
beaten by J~m, and moreover there is no rule that will delete 
!!!}_'.Self to yield *He persuaded me to have been beaten br_ Jim. Thus, 
we have an explanation for the non-ambiguity of nersuade vith for-to. 6 
Consider ncr~ the second sentence in (49), which has only the 
reading CAUSE TO BELTu"'VE. There is apparently no reason vhy the 
. 
other reading should be blocked. The only device that I knov of 
that can do the job is a 11 transderivational constraint",. of the 
kind recently proposed by Perlmutter and Le.koft'. Tra.nsderivational 
constraints are extremely powerful devices, and I do not knov Yhether 
they must be part of a grammar. However, should this turn out to 
be so, w:e would then have an additional argument that '1.1<:!rsua.de is 
not an atomic unit, but rather arises through a de;rive.tion in which 
prelexieal transformations operate on elementary semantic primes, 
We shall conclude our discussion of the lexical decomposition 
of COSUB verbs by considering the behavior of verbs of ordering 
and request in re1ation to the paradigm of (44)-(46): 
( 50) He ( ~~~:red } me (to be beaten by Jim l 
(_*that Martha should leavejLbegged 
( 51) 	 He .asked me {to be beaten by Jim } •Lthat Martha should leave 
We can see that most verbs of ordering behave as if they contained 
HAVE T0 1 except aak, that behaves es if it contained INTEND. 
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Earlier (page 66), I maintained that there va.s no justification 
ror treating ask as different from the other verbs, and that 
Posta.l's positing of a separate modal constraint for~ was 
unmotivated, It turns out, however 1 that Postal was right, and 
that ask is apparently different from the other verbs of ordering. 
This conclusion must, of course, be vieved as tentative until more 
evidence capable of discriminating between the four model. primes 
is produced, If such evidence turns up, it should cause no big 
surprise, for~. even on the interrogative reading, has some 
surprising properties. 
We recall the pe.radigm mentioned in chapter one and vhich I 
reproduce below: 
(52) I esked John to leave, 
(53) I asked John when to leave. 
It see~s that ask is a verb of .request in (52} nnd a.~ interrogative 
in ( 53 j , As interroge.tives do not appear to be future-action-
orient~d, it is not obvious why the subject of leave should be 
undern'tood only as 1.. but not as John. in (53). We recall that 
McCa~ley espoused the proposa.1 (originally made by Jerry Morgan, I 
believe) thet interrogative~ be analyzed as ask (or reouest} to 
tell, and suggested that (53) be derived from (54): 
(54) I. asked John, to tel.l ms. ( the answer to the1 1 , 
questionj when I 1 should leave. 
The only difficulty with this proposal is that it does not 
explain why~ and the second I should be coreferential, for telling 
someone the answer to a question seems to be a declarative performance, 
:·, 
0 
I'  ' 
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I think we ca.n eliminate this difficulty in light of the discussion 
on pages 67-69, which led to the conclusion that modals and 
infinitives are distinct complementizers, and that only the 
infinitive is future-action-oriented and therefore requires a 
unique controller. We must therefore modify (54) by deleting the 
answer to the ouestion a.nd by replacing should with an infinitive. 
!n the new version of (54), the complement of tell becomes future-
action-oriented, a point supported by the ungrammaticality of 
(55): 
(55) *I asked John to tell me when to have left. 
If the modified version of (54) is indeed the sout'ce of (53), then 
the ungraxmna.ticality of (55) would lead us to predict that (56) 
will also be ungrammatical, which is precisely what turns out to 
be the case: 
(56) *I asked John when to have left. 
Footnotes 
1For some problems arising in connection with the class of 
verbs mentioned ~n this paragraph and their implications for the 
va.lidity or the Subject-Subject Proposal, see the Epilogue to 
this chapter. 
2wotice that the ungrammaticality of (22) is not due to the 
fact that knov embeds a stative (have), Indeed, (Uis grammatical 
while (ii)---rs-not, 
(i) I know where John has been living since 1950. 
(ii) *I knov where to have been living since 1950, 
3A possible alternative explanation for the paradigm (25)-(28) 
might be that (25} and (2p) dirfer semantically in that the former 
suggests a particular occasion when eating takes place while the 
latter is timeless. In that case, (28) could be semantically 
incongruous rather than syntactically deviant; indeed, the timeless-
ness associated with the infinitival complementizer is incompatible 
~ith the past tense. 
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4rt constitutes a weakness in the Subject-Subject Proposal 
that! have been unable to find lexical equivalents for the Inter-
mediate Predicates of IF-causatives.' The closest we can get to such 
an Intermediate Predicate is to select ha•,e to, •..,.hich looks like 
an IF-verb up to a point, but does not make it all the way. Thust 
(i} a is unacceptable, but (i) bis not: 
(i) a. *I had to go, but I did not go, 
b. I had to go, but Ma.r.r prevented me, 
The only way out of this difficulty is to posit a prime HAVE TO 
which differs from have to in being an IF-predicate. This solution, 
although unfortunate, is not ~ithout precedent. For example, 
Leroy Baker analyzes learn as come to know and teach as cause to 
come to know in his doctoral dissertation. How~ learn and teach 
are non-factives while kno~ is a factive, and Baker's analysis ---
seems to require a non-factive KlfOW vhich happens not to be 
lexica.lized in English. Such a situation is undesirable, a.sit 
weakens arguments thit put for-Jard shared constraints of some 
lexically complex verb and its immediate predicate. Indeed, a.s 
ve cannot test the acceptability of sentences containing primes, 
we a.re ~orced to use the corresponding lexical items instead. 
That is, ~e are forced to use exs.mples ~ith know a.nd have to, when 
,;.;e wou.ld like to use KJmw e.nd P..AVE TO respectively. As I pointed 
out above, this weakens certain claims that we ma:,,· want to make, 
but I run not aware of a more satisfactory solution at this point. 
5tiotice that, due to the ambiguity of' the infinitive perf'ect, 
it is necessary to add a past time adverb in order to make (i) 
ru::td ( ii ) truly unacceptable. In f'act, the a.cceptebili ty oi' ( i ) and 
(ii) depends on the continua,.tion: · 
{i) I intend to ha.ve left J!': tomorrowl . 
· 	 ~~esterday J 
(ii) 	 He persuaded me to have left lbY the following evening].
L*on the previous morning 
6There is one embarrassing fact which weak.ens the claim that 
INTEND is the Immediate Predicate of persuade. Thus. (i) is 
acceptable, but (ii) is not. 
( i) John intends for Ma..-y to go. 
(ii) *I persuaded John for Mary to go. 
I have no explanation for this fact, and am forced to adopt the 
usual (legitimate?·) solution to the effect that nersue.de does not 
share all the syntactic properties of the lexical items corresponding 
to the priJ!les it contains, 
Epilogue to Chapter Three· 
There are some rather serious problems 'With the decomposition 
of the verb~ of orderi~g and request, in particular vith the prime 
TRY and the !ntermediate Predicates, 
Thus, the reason ~hy TRY ~as selected vas that, like tne verbs 
of ordering and request, it implies nothing e.bou.t the truth r:,f its 
complement, whether it is asserted or denied. Notice, however, 
that the verbs of ordering and request, unlike the verb try, are 
performa.tives . Moreover, it is not possible for Pro-forms or 
deleted sub-strings to be understood as identical vith the complement 
of TRY, a.s we can see in the folloving paradigm: 
(i) I tried to get him to intend to go, but I failed. 
(ii) *I ordered him to go, but I failed. 
A possible vay to explain the above paradigm avay would be to point 
out that a complete Bnalysis of verbs of ordering an~ request would 
have to include some specification that the performs.nee in question 
is an oral one. Such additional specifications can be shovn to 
interfere with anaphoric processes in independent cases, ~sin the 
paradigm below. 
(iii) 	 John killed Mary, but I'm not sure when he brought it 
about. 
(iv) 	?John assassinated the Premier, but,I'm not sure when 
he brought it about. 
It will be noticed that the representation of assassinate has· 
been 	claimed by various Generative Semanticists to consist of' the 
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representation of kill plus t.he specification that the victim is 
a person of so~e importance, whose death came about for political 
reasons. 
With respect to the possible Intermediate Predicates of Yerbs 
of ordering and request, it will be noticed that they do not seem 
to be semantically necessary, since X orders Y to go seems to be 
roughly equivalent to X tries to cause Y to ~o, and there is hardly 
an intuitive need for an Intermediate Predicate embedded between 
CAUSE and £.Q.• "The sole justi.fica.tion for such a. predicate is the 
need for a COSUB, as CAUSE does not satisfy this condition, Thus, 
the postulation of COSUB Intermediate Predicate in this case appears 
somewhat ad hoc and needed onl.y to make the Subject-Subject 
Proposal work. 
It is to be hoped that the problems I brought out here are 
due to the specific analysis proposed for verbs of ordering and 
request, and that they do not invalidate the Subject-Subject Proposal. 
Further research is necessary, but should it eventually turn out 
that there are no good motivations for maintaining the Subject-
Subject Proposal in its present forn~ it will still be possible to 
vithdrav to a ;,,ea.ker position, without reverting to the Marked-
Verb Proposal. The main defect of the Marked-Verb Proposal is its 
claim that controller selection is an idiosyncratic matter which does 
not allow for general predictions. If this ~e correct, we vould 
expect a different distribution of exceptions in other languages in 
which there are counterparts of the English verbs mentioned in the 
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discussion and a rule of NP-Deletion. However, in all la.np;ua,r.es 
· that l knov of, the controller for verbs like Erornise is its surface 
subject and for verbs like order it is the surface object, which 
suggests that there are general semantic factors involved in 
cont?"oller selection. Notice that the Subject-Subject Proposal 
makes in fact two clairns,that set it apart from the Marked-Verb 
Proposal: 
{a) the 	controller is discoverable by general principles 
(b) 	 the controller is always the subject of the 
Intermediate Predicate, 
These two claims are mutually independent, e.nd we can retain the 
formerwhile 	rejecting the latter. Thus, if it should turn out that 
neither the decomposition of uromise nor tho.t of order ( a.nd their 
\
likes) ca.n be carried out along the lines suggested in this chapter, 
and that these verbs are, after all, W1derla.in by two-place 
elementary predicates, we shall have the option of dividing the 
COSUB class into two subclasses. To the t·,..o semantic features tha.t 
we used for the characterization of COSUBs, we shall add a feature 
like "oriented toward a. fut\U'e action that its first argument ( i . e . , 
deep subject) ca.n carr'L out. 11 Verbs like promise will bear the 
va.lue "+" for this feature, wile those like norder" vill bee.r the 
value "-11 As for verbs that allow decomposition into Intermediate 
Predicates, we can consider this feature inapplicable to them (or 
vacuously taking the value u+ 11 ). 
A.PPEND!X TO CHAPTER THREE 
The Semantic Primes Used in this Chapter 
In this Appendix, I define the semantic primes that occurred in 
the body of the thesis. It will be noted that the semantic content 
of primes is generallY defined in relation to some lexical item, 
' which, in a somevha.t loose sense, 11corresponds" to it. T'ne 
following seven primes are defined below: CAUSE, INCHOATIVE, TRY, 
WTE!ID, BE ABLE TO , BE FREE TO , UAVE TO. 
(1) :rt mee.ns roughly brini;; about, vit:.out the idiosyncratic 
connotations of the latter (e.g., that its complement is slov in 
coming about, or that some resistance has to be overcome in order 
that the state of affairs described by the complement come about). 
(2) It takes two arguments, a subJect and a sentential 
complement. 
(3) !tis non-stative. 
(4) Its complement subject may or may not be ooreferentiaJ. 
vith its own subject. 
(5) It may embed itself~ like in I .brought it about that John 
murdered his best friend. 
(6) 	 It ia an IF-predicate, in Karttunen's sense.  
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IUCHOATIVE 
(l) It means roughly come about (again without the possible 
idiosyncrasles of the latter). 
(2) It takes one argument, a sentential subject. 
(3) It has some stative properties, although its status is 
not entirely clear, as c~n be seen in the folloving paradigm: 
(i) I think Mary is reddening 
(ii) *Redden! 
.;-. 
(iii) *What Mary did was redden. 
In addition, some people find stative predicates odd with time 
adverbs. Thus, (iv) strikes some people as strange. But (v) is 
certs.inly all right: 
(iv) ?The 	president vas popular at rour o'clock. 
(v) 	 The president became popular at four o'clock (when 
he told the nation he was ending the war). 
(4) As far a.s I can judge, IllCHOATIVE does not embed itself~ 
as we do not get *It's co~ing about that the metal is hardening. 
Some people do get It came about that the metal hardened, but I do 
not think that come about is understood as inchoative in this case; 
rather, it seems to be synonymous with happened. 
(5) It is an IMPLICATIVE predicate. 
-TRY 
(1) It ha.s roughly the_ meaning of~?""/ or attemnt. 
(2) It is non-stative, 
(3) It takes two arguments, an animate subject and a sentential 
complement. 
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(4) It does not embed itself. 
(5) It embe4s non-statives, and also certain statives, but not 
all: 
(i) I tried to break into the house. 
(ii) I tried to hate Mar3 , but I couldn't. 
(iii) 11 tried to be popular. 
{iv) *I tried to be tall, 
What is going on he~e? I think that in (ii)-{iv) there is an 
intervening sentence with a causative predicate (like Perlmutter 1 s 
get) vhich is l~ter deleted. In fact, the only possible interpreta-
tion of (iii) is I tried to bring it about that I becoi:ne £Opula£_. 
If this is correct, we can say that TRY can onl.y embed a non-stative. 
The unacceptability of (iv) can be attribut~d to the semantic 
incongruity of the putative complement of m._, i.e., I brought it 
about that I became tall. 
(6} It is future-action-oriented. Wld requires coreferentiality 
betveen its subject and its complement subject in underlying 
structure, 
(7) As Perlmutter points out, vhen (6) is apparently violated, 
there a.re grounds for assuming an intervening sentence with let or 
get. Hovever, this intervening sentence can onl.y be deleted if the 
process of deletion does not leed to violation of coreferent1ality 
in surface structure. Thus, Ye get (v) but not (vi): 
(v) I tried to be arrested. 
(vi) *I tried for Pat to leave. 
G~7  
(l) It has roughly the meaning of intend in a definite senae. 
Tlie last four words a.re important, for (i) is a good sentence for 
some speakers. However, we rule out (ii} by fiat: 
(i} 	 I intend to leave, but I have not finally made up 
my mind yet. 
(ii) 	*I INTENP to leave, but I have not fina.lly made up 
my mind yet. 
(2) }t is 	a stative. 
(3) It takes tvo a.r'gUments, an animate subject e.nd a complement. 
(4) It does not embed itself, 
(5) It does not embed statives. 
(6) 	 It disallqws emotive adverbs in its complement, e.g.: 
(iii)*! intend to go reluctantly. 
(7) It is future-action-oriented, therefore the time of its 
complement is future with respect to the time of the clause containing 
UTEND. As a. consequence, underlying-structure coreferentiality is 
required between the subject of DlTEND and its complement s1,1bj ect. 
(8) Apparent violations of (7) entail a deleted underlying 
sentence. Unlike TRY, Ul'HlID allows the deletion of this sentence 
in all cases: 
(iv) I intend to be arrested. 
(v) I intend that Ben should leave, 
BE ABLE .TO 
(1) It has roughly the meaning of non-epistemic.£!:!!_, and is 
completely unmarked for the kind o~ ability it describes (such as 
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internal ability, ability resulting from the removal of external 
obstacles, etc,). 
(2} (7) a.re identical to the corresponding requirements ror 
I?iTEIID. In connection vith (5) , such sentences as She can be 
happy, (if she ~ants to}~ are presumably decomposable as sm: IS 
ABLE TO CSHE CAUSE CINCHOATIVE CSHE BE HAPPYJJJ. 
(8) It disallows any apparent violation or (7), as can be 
seen 	in the folloripg paradigm: 
{i) *He is able to be arrested. 
(ii) 	 *He is able .(that Mer.r should be arrested}
l!or Mary to be arrested 
{9) It is a.n om,Y-IF-predice.te. 
BE FREE TO 
(1) It has roughly the meaning of non-epistemic~, as in 
I mEzy" go, meaning l have_permission to go, but not as in You m,!2 150, 
meaning you are hereby given permission to go. EE FREE TO is. in 
some intuitive sense, pa.rtia.1.1y similar in meaning to BE ABLE TO; 
the difference is, I think, that having pel"ll!ission to do something 
does not make one able to do that thing (as one may lack the internal 
ability to do so, or there ma;y- be further external obstacles). On 
the other hand, BE ABLE TO implies that there a.re no obstacles of 
any lr.ind. Thus, e.J.thou!#). ! enabled him to 'Win the .fight only 
assexts that I have removed all obstacles that might have prevented 
him :from winning the fight, it also implies tbat he has the internal 
ability to carr-J it out, for (i) is ver;r odd: 
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(i) 	7I enabled him to win the tight, but he couldn't 
do it. 
(2) - (7} are identical to the corresponding requirements for 
IrfTEND. 
(8) It allows apparent violations of (7) in underlying structure, 
provided that there be no violations in surface structure: 
(ii) I have permission to be arrested. 
(iii) *I have ~ermission for Ms.ey to leave. 
HAVE TO 
(l.) It has roughly the meaning of non-epistemic !1.!!!i• 
(2) - (7) are identical to the corresponding requirements for 
INTEND. 
(8) It allows apparent violations of {7) in underlying structure~ 
provided 	that there be no violations in surface structure: 
(i} I have to be arrested. 
}to leave }(ii} *I have (to) for Mary lto be arrested ' 
(9) It is an IF-predicate by fiat, in contradistinction to its 
corresponding lexeme, have to, 
CHAPI'ER FOUR 
ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS CONCERNiliG EQUI 
Lee's PEQUI-CEQUI Prouosa.l 
In proposing t'o break down EQUI into t•,ro pa.rts--DOOM MARKING 
and DOOM DELETION {see end of chapter one)--Postal leaves open the 
question vhether DOOM MARKIHG is one rule, or several distinct rules 
applying at different points in a derivation and "conspiring" at 
creating the environment ultimately required for OOOM DELETION. 
A proposal to have EQUI apply at two p~ints in a derivation 
is found in Lee (1969). Lee notes the existence of kl_-clauses in 
vhich two coreferentiaJ. NPs have been deleted, like: 
(l) The Premier was assassinated by being shot. 
and whose source is presumably: 
(2) X assassinated the Premier by [X shot the premier], 
I assu.~e that g[-clauses of this kind, which make precise the method 
used in carrying out the activity described in the main clause, are 
subject to vha.t we may call a "holistic coreferentia.lity constraint", 
under certain conditions. By holistic coreferentiality constraint 
I mean that all the J:fPs represented in the ma.in clause.must have 
coreferents in the underlying structure of the ~-clause. The 
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conditions under vhich this constraint holds are (a) the verb of 
the ma.in clause is noil-ste.ti.ve and (b) it is understood that the 
subject acted directly up,;in the obJect. Condition (a} is probably 
redundant, for stative v~rbs do not take :!?l,-clauses of this kind. 
condition (o) is, however, important, for if it is not satisfied t 
the constraint does not hold,·as in (3), which is groonmatical: 
{3) John frightened Maryi by shooting Bill, 
Thus~ we can have (~). but not (5), (6) or (7): 
(4) 	 Johni vounded MaryJ with a knif'ek by hitting herj 
'. vith itk, 
{5) *John1 vounded Maryj vith a knifek by hitting Bill 
with itk' 
(6) 	*Johni wounded MaryJ ·.nth a knifek by hitting herj 
with a bludgeon. 
(7) 	*John1 vounded Maryj with a. knifek by Bil.l's hittinp;: 
her.1 with itk. 
A variant of (li) is (8), in vhich co.referentiality relations a.re a.lso 
obligatorJ, but the function of the coreferential NPs is different 
in the two clauses. However, if Lakoff's claim that instrumental 
a4verbs e.re derived from clauses containing B.!llt, the difference 
bet'W'een (4) and (8) is purely superficial. 
(8} Johni wounded Hary.1 with a knifek by uaine; itk to 
hit hel); (witn). ' 
Lee notes that the deletion of both NPs is obligatory in (1), 
as we get neither (9) nor {10): 
(9) *The Premie~ was assassinated by his bein~ shot. 
(10) *The Premier vas assassinated .by being shot by f :;:eone} ' 
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As both NPs to be deleted a.re in the same clause, and n.s both 
controllers are also in the same clause, we cannot have the two lrPs 
deleted by having EQUI apply on two separate cycles. On the other 
hand, it is not possible toincrea.se the power of EQUI a.nd allow it 
to delete a.ll corefe:rential NPs in a subordinate clause, for this 
would yieldungra.'ll!M.tica.1 sentences like (11} or (12): 
(11) 	*Someone assassinated the Premier by shooting with 
a gun, 
(12) *f.ohn wounded Mary w-ith a knife by fhitting with } 
· 	 ~usin~ to hit vith 
:Both NPs ca.n be deleted only when they a.re in sub,ject position. The 
first application of EQUI has to be pre-cyclical, for EQUI, by its 
Yer'./ nature, ce.nnot apply on the f'irst cycle. lfovever, !. must be 
deleted in (2) before passivizati~n has ap;lied in the first cycle 
and removed it from subject position. As we ce.nnot·have a. first 
cycle rule that looks at a. higher sentence, the conclusion that the 
rule that deletes·! is precyclic seems inescapable. Let uPEQUin = 
11precyclic EQUI'' a.nd 11CEQUI 11 = "cyclic EQUI. 11 Lee notes that if 
EQUI precedes PASSIVE, the latter must be modified to allow it to 
apply to subJectless sentences. This is not necessary in our frame-
work, vhere EQUI is replaced by DpOM MARKIUG e.t this point, As the 
doomed subject is not actually removed from the string, the SD of 
PASSIVE need not be modiried. 
With respect to CEQUI, Lee clail?ls that it must follow PASSIVE, 
in view of (13): 
(13) Mary 	wants to be beaten by Otto. 
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AS can be seen from (13), Lee's ordc~in; is not intended 
within the cycle. Hm1e,,er. l 'believe thc.t i::iuch e. claim 
needs to ue made, in view of the followinp,: in order to derive 
(l) frolli (2), we se.'"' that PEQUI and pa.ssivization on the first cycle 
are required. Suppose now that CI!:QUI precedes PASSIVE; if CEQU! 
applies on the second cycle and PASSIVE (a.n optional rule) does 
not, we get the ungrWJJlllatica..1 (14): 
(14) *Someone assassinated the Premier by beinp. shot. 
If e.n interpretation cab be imposed on (14), it ce.n at best be that 
the assassin ~as shot. This suggests that the controller in CEQVI 
must be in subject position, and the Premier ce.n get to t.ha.t position 
only t."-lrough PASSIVE. Therefore , CEQUI , (or DOOM MARKING) , must 
follo'- PASSIVE. 
It is interesting to note that both kinds of EQUI that npply to 
~ -clauses of the sort considered by Lee vork rro~ subject to subject. 
!n chapter three, I arP,ued that deep structure coreferential1t:r· 
., constraints for purpose-oriented verbs mu.st also be subject-subject, 
; . 
.,. and it vould be interesting to see whether the two kinds of EQUI 
;~ .f: proposed by Lee ca.n apply to sentences vith COSUB ve~bs, and if so , 
,,-;, :,  
~{;;· w-hether they both l(ork from subject to subJ ect. The reason for  
!",··· 
(, looking into this matter is the.t EZ,-cJ.auses and clauses containinp: 
, · •; 
t COSUB verbs have something in col!llllon: they both exhibit deep structure 
J·;'.
t
, 
goreterentiality constraints. We sav in chapter one tha.t verbs that 
~":' 
~,:_' do not require coreterentiality of some kind al.low more than one 
r: :-:  
C'. controller, therefore we cannot impose such a condition on EQUI vith  
t  
res:pect to them. :rt seems~ hovever, that we must impose the subject-
subject condition on CEQUI in ~clauses, which makes one vonder 
vhether the subject-subject condition must be stated both in deep 
structure and in the structural. description of CEQUI. Before attempting 
to answer the question, let us consider the behavior of other sentences 
in which coreferentiality constraints appear to be needed. 
Consider the following sentences: 
(15) John. asked the gUa.rd to admit himi to the buildin~.
• l. 
(16) 	*John asked the guardJ to be admitted by himj to the 
building.1 
(17) John 	asked the guard to be admitted to the bui1din~. 
(18) 	*The guard vas asked by John to be admitted to the 
building. 
(19) 	 The guard was asked by John1 to admit him1 to the 
building. 
In (15), the object of ask e.nd the subject of ~must be eoreferen-
tia.l, e.nd, if ask is decomposed as TRY TO CAUSE TO COME TO INTEND--
as I suggested in chapter three--the constraint concerns the subject 
of INTEND and the subJect of admit, !n order to get (15), there 
a;re no compelling reasons for claiming that EQUI is precyclic or 
cyclic. But in order to get (lT), EQUI must apply both precyclically 
and cyclically. In particular~ the deep subject of~ must' be 
deleted {in fact, doomed) precyclically, for cyclical EQUI can apply 
only on the second cycle, after P!t5SIVE has applied on the £irst 
cycle, removing the gµard from subject position, We cannot dispense 
with PEQUI, for ve must avoid the ungrammatical (16), With respect 
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to CEQUI, we see,that it must follow PASSIVE. Indeed 1 if it precedes 
PASSIVE, it will apply on the second cycle to Yield (17). But then 
it 'Will be 	ha.rd to explain vhy the application of PASSIVE to {17) 
r·esults in the ungra.mma.tical (18), and we would have to invent ad-hoc 
restrictions on the application of PASSIVE. However, if EQUI follows 
PASSIVE, we get (17) in case PASSIVE does not apply. If PASSIVE 
does apply, EQUI becomes inapplicable, for the subject-subject 
condition is not s.atisfied, and (18) is blocked. We see that in this 
case, as in the case of the El_-c1auses, we must impose the subject-
subject condition on CEQUI. 
Consider now the set: 
(20) John 	promised Bill to take him to the hospital. 
(21) 	 Bill was promised by John to be taken to the 
hospital (*by him)l 
(22) 	*Bill was promised by John to take him to the 
hosp:i.tal. 
(23) John promised Bill to be taken to the hospital.2 
This set raises Illl,lch more difficult problems than the previous examples. 
We cannot explain the ungrammaticalitj• of (22) by imposing the 
subject-subject condition on CEQUI, for (22) is derived from (20) 
without any application of EQUI. Indeed, the subject of~ is 
doomed by PEQUI. If nothing happens on any cycle, (20) results. 
But if PASSIVE applies only on the second cycle, the result is 
ungrammatical. However, if PASSIV'i applies on 'both cycles, the 
result is the grammatical (21). 
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What is going on here? It seems that the subject-subject 
condition on CEQUI is of no avail here, unleas we vant to make it 
obligatory even for ite~s already doomed by PEQUI. In any event, 
there is something intuitively unsatisfactory about a condition that 
has to be imposed on deep structures as well as on a transformation, 
and one car.not escape the feeling that a generalization is beinF 
missed. This impression is reinforced by the observation that no 
subject-subject condition is needed for PEQUii which applies on a 
structure still undeformed by transfonations and in which subject-
subject coreferentiality is ensured by the deep structure constraints. 
Therefore, the subject-subject condition had to be mentioned only 
for CEQUI, and only in those cases in vhich deep structure coreferen-
tia.lity vas a requirement. T'ne mess can b~ straightened out by 
removing the suoject...subject condition from cyclic EQU!t and by 
imposing the following derivationa.l constraint: 
{24) If the subjects of two sentences must be 
coreferen~ial in underlying structure, their 
subjects at the end of the cycle must also 
be coreferential.3 --
Condition: Neither the subject nor the.predicate 
of either sentence has been raised o~ 
deleted by the end of the cycle. 
The above condition constrains the dome.in of applicability of 
(24), vhich does not hold in sentences like (25) and .(26) a. 
(25) I intend for John to leave. 
(26) a. I persuaded John to leave. 
b. John was persuaded by me to leave. 
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Indeed, 	underlying structure coreferentiality is satisfied in 
(25) through a get or let sentence whose subject and predicate have 
been deleted by the end of the cycle. In (26) a, underlyin~ 
coreferentiality is satisfied through the Intermediate Predicate 
INTEND, ·..hich has been moved upwe.rds by PREDICATE RAISING before the 
end of tbe cycle, and is grouped with the t~o initially hir,her 
predicates INCHOATIVE and CAUSE. As the restrictions on a predicate 
a.re not transmitted to 	the group into "Which it hes been raised~ 
r 
(24) does not hold for the lexical item :E_ersuade, inserted in place 
of that group, and passivization can occur freely, as in (26) b. 
(24) does, however, hold for nromise, regardless of whether 
we decompose it or not. If we do not, it holds for obvious reasons. 
If we do, it holds through the topmost causative sentence, whose 
subject and predicate are neither deleted nor raised. It is 
a.ppa.rent that (24) can handle ell the cases discussed in this 
chapter. The reason vhy it mentions the output of the cycle rather 
than sUi"face structure is that the doomed NPs are still available 
at that point 1 since the rule that deletes them--DOOM DELETIO!i--
is postcyclical. Let us consider one more case which (24) can 
handle and which the subject-subject condition on cyclic EQUI cannot. 
It is well-known tha.t purpose clauses require that their sub.Ject be 
coreferentia.l ~ith the subject of the matrix sentence. Conside~ 
now the following: 
(27) a. We bought the oysters in order to fry them. 
b, 	 The oysters wer.e bought by us in order to 
be fried. 
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(27) 	 c. *The oysters vere bought by us in order to 
fey them. 
The above paradigm is identical to the one formed by (20)-(22). 
The subject ot fry is doomed precyclically, and the un~ra.mma.ticality 
of (27) c results from the mere application of PASSIVE to {27) a. 
Therefore, the ungreumnaticality of (27) c cannot be blamed on CEQUI, 
and must be handled by (24). 
I believe that (24) is a much more satisfactory solution than 
having both deep structure constraints and the same constraints 
repeated for a transformation. Notice, however. that (24) i5 not 
the only we.y out that suggests itself. One might think (especially 
if one finds (21) and (27) b ungrammatical) that deep structure 
con~traints can be eliminated altogether and the subject-subject 
condition imposed on both PEQUI and CEQUI. This is in fact the 
solution chosen by Lee, Eut I tend to reject it for three reasons: 
(a) there seems to be an intuitive feeling that the core-
ferentiality constraint found in £l.-Clauses, future-action oriented 
clauses and purpose adverbial clauses is required on semantic 
grounds (seep, 27). If so. it belongs in underlying structure. 
(b) deep structure constraints are required in the grammar 
independently of transformations. Consider, for example, the folloving: 
{28) I killed 	Johni by stabbing him1. 
(29) *I killed 	Johni by stabbing Billj. 
The 11holistic" 	coreferentiality requirement of' kl_-clauses cannot 
possibly be blamed on a tra.nsformation. 4 
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(c) the only argument given by tee ap;a.inst Perlmutter's deep 
structure constraints in invalid. Perlmutter had cl~~me~ that 
persuade required i-ts object to be coreferential to its co!llplement 
subject, and bad illustrated his point vith the following .exampl~s: 
(30) *I persuade.d Clarabelle for Clem to p.;t.ow the field. 
(31) I persuaded Clarabelle to plov the field. 
Lee claims that the corererentiality requirement arises only aftor 
the int:roduction of the for-to complementizer, for, if tlle comple-
mentizer is~' no core:t'erentia.l.ity is required: 
t 
(32) 	 I persuaded Cle.rabeLle that Clem should plow the 
fiel.d. 
Hoveve:r, nothing for the pury,oses of the present arp,ument fol.lows 
from. ( 32) , for the nersua.de of ( 32) and the nersua.de of ( 31) a.re 
d!fferent verb~, although rrobably re:eted (see also my 
discussion of this point on pp. 76-77 ) • 
Notice that {24) does not remove the need to order CEqUI after 
PASSIVE, in view ot (18)~ 
Grinder 1s SUPER-EQUl-NP-DELETlON Rule 
Grinder (1970) ele.ims that there is a. rule that deletes MPs 
under coreferentiality conditions across intervening sentence nodes~ 
as in John knew that criticizing himself would be di.ff'icult, and 
argues that this l:"Ul~--SUPER-EQUI-NP-DELETION--1hould be adjacent 
to EQUI in the cyclical ordering. The nature.l next step is to 
collapse· $:QUI and SUPER-EQUI ~ and Grinder proposes Just this. The 
problem that confronts us now is whether G~inder's proposal is 
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compatible with the discussion in the previous section, since 
Grinder proposes the ordering SUPER-EQUI, RAISING~ PASSIVE, and 
we concluded that CEQUI followsPASSIVE, I believe that the 
conflict between Grinder's proposal and mine is only a.Pparent, 
since the ordering he proposes is not the only poasible one. 
In arguing for a.n ordering of SUPER-EQUI before nAISI!l'G and 
PASSIVE. Grinder points out that deletion is normally blocked by 
an intervening Mf, unless the latter is e. clause mate of the 
controller (this ist in fact, predicted by Langacker's principle of 
control). However, an intervening NP that became a clause ma.te 
or the controller through RA!SIMG blocks the application of SUPER 
EQUI. Therefore, SUPER EQUI must precede RAISING. Grinder's 
examples are given below: 
(33) Tom told Harriet that it would be tough to 
prevent [hi~self} from crying at the 
lherself 
;.edding. 
{34) 	*Elmer claimed that Jennifer knew that it was 
necessary to brush his own teeth. 
(35) 	*Elmer claimed Jennifer to have known that it was 
necessary to bt"Uah his owil. teeth, 
(36) 	*Jennifer was claimed by Elmer to have knovn that 
it was necessary to brush his own teeth. 
In (33), Harriet does not block SUPER EQUI. However, in (35), 
Jennifer does block it, although it is a clause mate of Ellner. 
Therefore, SUP£R EQUI must apply to a structure like (34), where 
proven that SUPER EQUI must precede RAISING. 
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With regard. to the ordering of SUPER EQUI a.nd PASSIVE, Grinder 
points out the un~rammaticality of (36), in which Elmer is closer 
to the deleted subject than Jennifer is, and still cannot function 
as controller. Notice, however, the.t (36) can be ruled out if we 
extend (24) to cover such cases, That is, if we slightly modify (24) 
to make it read as follows: 
.(24'} If' the. sub,jects of t',,/'o predicates a.re coreferentitl 
in underlying structure, their subjects 
must be coreferential in the output of the 
cycle. 
Of course, (24') is irrelevant if RAISING must precede PASSIVE. But 
it has recently been show-n the.t if RAISING he.s the power to raise a· 
subject to either object or subject position, it becomes unnecessary 
to order RAISIN"G before PASSIVE. In conclusion, • .,e can collapse 
EQUI and SUPER EQUI and still explain (18), for the orderin~ PASSIVE, 
SUPER EQUI, RAISING is, in ~act, perfectly possible, 
Regardless of this issue, I believe that Grinder is right in 
claimiQg that there are not two separate rules7- EQUI and SUPER EQUI--
and that EQU! is a special case of SUPER EQUI. Both rules operate 
Yithin the same lini.its--those of the principle of control-except 
that ..•e have a.n instance of EQUI proper when the complement subject 
happens to be one clause below the controller. In general, we do 
not find cases of SUPER EQUI, where controller-uniqueness is determined 
by deep structure coreferentiality constraints, for SUPER EQUI 
occurs when the matrix verb is a declarative. The reason for this is 
that non-declaratives require a coreferential subject in the 
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immediately lower.sentence. There are, however, cases of SUPER EQUI 
in which the controller has to be unique, and Grinder considers such 
cases to be counterexamples (see his footnote 9}. As an instance, 
consider (37), in which the subject of admit is understood as John 
but not the guard: 
(37) 	 John asked the guard whether it would be difficult 
to be admitted to the buildin~. 
We recall McCawley 1 s proposal presented in chapter three, e.ccordin;;; 
to which (37) wouYd have a source like (38): 
(38) 	 John1 asked the guardj [the guardj tell John1 whether 
1 for himi} to be admitted to the buildinp; would 
{.!for himj 
be difficult]. 
It seems that tell is indeed a declarative, so that the controller 
restriction appears puzzling. Recall, however, the discussion in 
chapter three, pp. 67-69 , where I suggested that deep structure 
core~erentia.lity constraints may hold even for declaratives, if the 
complement is future with respect to the matrix declarative verb. 
And in fact, the constraint no longer holds if we change the tense 
of the complement of ask in (37) to yield (39): 
(39) 	 John asked the guard whether it had been difficult 
to be admitted to the building. 
The subject of admit ce.n be understood as either John or the euard. 
The reading with John as controller is semantically odd in ordinary 
circumstances, but quite all right if we assume that John has been 
struck by temporary amnesia a.nd is asking the guard to tell him 
about an experience that he cannot remember anythin~ about. We see 
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that (37) is not really a counterexample to the principle of control~ 
as Grinder thought. 
Let us now inquire whether SUPER EQUI, like EQUI, must apply 
both precyclically and cyclically. It seel!ls unlikely that we should 
find instances of precyclic SUPER EQUI. Indeed, recall that PEQUI 
was necessary for El.-clauses and for complements of a verb like ask, 
in ,.:hich t•"7o NPs had to be deleted under conditions of coreferentia.11ty. 
I do not see how other sentences could intervene between £r_-clauses 
and their matri.ces; a.t for ask, 'W'e only find the coreferentia.lity 
re~uirement with respect to the im.~ediately lower clause, not all 
lover clauses. Thus, al\hough (40) is bad, (41} is not: 
(40) 	*John asked the guard to be admitted to the buildin~ 
by Bill.l 
(41) 	 John asked the gUard whether it would be difficult  
to be admitted to the building by Bill.  
It seems that SUPER EQUI should be collapsed only with CEQUI. 5  
The cyclicity of SUPER EQUI is apparent in sentences like (41), where  
deletion must follow.the application of ~ASSIVE on the first cycle.  
Additional evidence of the cyclic character of SUPER EQUI is furnished 
by the following very nice example given by Grinder: 
(42) 	 That it was likely that washing (himself } would 
l*herseli' 
disturb Pete surprised Eileen. 
( 43) That washing 	 likely to disturb-[:;:::i~ } vas 
Pet~ surprised Eileen. 
(42) and (43) have the same deep structure~ except that EXTRAPOSITIOlf 
' 
~: has a.ppli ed to the former and RAISING to the latter. In fa.ct, 
,. 
::_. 
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E.XTRAPOSITION is irrelevant to ( 42), ae it is probably a post-
cyclic rule (es claimed by Ross in his dissertation). The 
ungrammaticality of {42) when Eileen is the subject o~ vash follows 
from the ungrBlll.~atica.lity o~ (4h) under the same circumstances: 
(44) That that ~ashing lhimself} would disturb
l'fherself' 
Pete was likely surprised Eileen. 
I assu:me that (42) was chosen rather than {41) as repeated self-
embedding makes th' acceptability of the latter hard to judge. 
The important distinction between (42) and (44) on the one hand and 
(43} on the other is that, in the former two cases, 
be the controller, since Pete controls the subject of wash; ~n the 
latter case, however, Pete can act as controller bef'ore RAISIUG 
applies, while Eileen can be the controller Hter RAISING has applied. 
Indeed, notice that after the application of' RA.ISING on the third 
cycle, Pete no longer com!llands the subject of wash, a.nd therefore 
fails to control it. 
Before concluding, I wish to stress a.n additional important 
point made by Grinder. He points out that the princip1e of control 
is a little too strong, as it would rule out the grammatical ( 45) , 
together with the ungrammatical (46)-(48). 
(45} John said that making a fool of himself disturbed 
Sue. 
(46) 	*John said that it disturbed Sue to make a fool of 
himself. 6 
(47) 	*That it disturbed Pete to wash herself surprised 
Eileen. 
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(48) 	*Th~t washing h~rselt disturbed Pete surprised 
Eileen. 
Therefore. 	SUPER EQUI-~which includes the former EQUI--ehould be 
t~rmulated 	as follows: 
(49) 	 An NPc can delete a coreferential NPk ths.t is 
the subject or a clause embedded at a point 
arbitrarily lover than NPc, un1ess there 
is an 11Pi such that l'l'Pi controls ?Wk,\ and 
(a) either N'Pi precedes NPk or {b) N??i 
lineai-ly intervenes b~tween NPc and ~JI\ . 
... 
Footnotea 
lsentences (l6)t (21), and (40) are fine if by.him and by' :Bill 
are contrastively stresse~. D. T. Langendoen pointed out to me that 
the rule of DOOM-DEL'SI'ION may be constrained.to apply ciniy to i~ems 
that do not bear contrastive stress. 
2Notice th~t in (21) and (23) the underiyins subject of take 
can 1;1.lso be understood as some unspecified agent, I believe that 
these·readings of the above sentences do not constitute real promises, 
but predictions or assurances, like in I promise you that you will 
be happz again. It seems that we need to pQait tvo homophonoue 
items :promise. On the reading on vhich (21) and {23) do constitute 
promises, there is, an intervening rrt-sentence, which gets deleted 
cyclically vitll the result that {2 •need no :Longer hol.o.. 
3An objection similar to that I raised against Rosenbaum's 
minimal distance principle c:an be raised against {24), namely that 
there must be a deeper reason why such a constraint shou1d exist. 
l believe that it serves~ purpose similar to the constraints 
involving the ordering of quantifiers discussed by Le.koff in 110n 
Generative Semantics", namely to make the reoonstructio~ of underlying 
structures possible, given surface structures and perceptual. strat.egies. 
4Aa I pointed out in chapter one, section (E), coreferent1aJ.ity 
constraints sometimes hold for verbs that allow a that-complementizer9 
when no deletion transformation app1ies~ The paradigm I mentioned 
there is repro_duced below: 
I confess that I killed John.  
*I co:o:1.'ess ~hat Mary killed John.  
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5As SUPER EQUI is only collapsed with CE.QUI , it becomes a 
rel~tively silllple matter to formulate PE~UI: 
s 
~
V NPi S 
I ~
CP-OJ V NP-
J l. 
C+DOOMJ 
.,,here the feeture P-0 on the verb stands for Hpur:oose.:.oriented. 11 
6Grinder points to a difficulty here. (46) is derived from 
(45) through EXTMPQSITIOif, and if (46) b to be ruled out throu,t.h 
the blocking of SUPP:n f<},UI, EXTAAPOS!TION should be cyclic. As 
there is evidence against the cyclicity of EXTRA?OS!TION, it seems 
we. must have recourse to a.n ad hoc deriva.tional constraint. D. 
T. La.ngendoen suggested to me that sµch a. derivational constraint 
would not be guite so ad hoc I since DOOM MARKING and DOOM DELET!OPJ 
are in fact ~~uivalent to a derivational constraint themselves , 
Thererore, we might perhaps say that extraposition of a clause 
around a.n UP wipes out any D001,1 mar~ing in that clause. Also, there 
a.re counterexamples to the claim made by (46), e.g. 
(i) John said that it proved some7hing to be able to 
look at himself in the morror that morning. 
I shall not attempt to decide the issue, a.s the situation seems far 
from clear. 
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